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Mobile health (m-Health) applications aim to deliver healthcare 
services through mobile applications regardless of time and place. An m-
Health application makes use of wireless communications to sustain its 
health services and often providing a patient-doctor interaction. Therefore, 
m-Health applications present several challenging issues and constraints, 
such as, mobile devices battery and storage capacity, broadcast 
constraints, interferences, disconnections, noises, limited bandwidths, 
network delays, and of most importance, privacy and security concerns.  
In a typical m-Health system, information transmitted through wireless 
channels may contain sensitive information such as patient’s clinic history, 
patient’s personal diseases information (e.g. infectious disease as HIV - 
human immunodeficiency virus). Carrying such type of information presents 
many issues related to its privacy and protection. 
 In this work, a cryptographic solution for m-Health applications 
under a cooperative environment is proposed in order to approach two 
common drawbacks in mobile health systems: the data privacy and 
protection. Two different approaches were proposed: i) DE4MHA that aims 
to guarantee the best confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of m-
health systems users data and ii) eC4MHA that also focuses on assuring and 
guarantying the m-Health application data confidentiality, integrity, and 
authenticity, although with a different paradigm. While DE4MHA considers 
a peer-to-peer node message forward, with encryption/decryption tasks on 
each node, eC4MHA focuses on simply encrypting data at the requester 




information through cooperative mobile nodes, giving them the only strictly 
required information, in order to be able to forward a request, until it 
reaches the Web service responsible to manage the request, and possibly 
answer to that same request. In this sense, the referred solutions aim any 
mobile health application with cooperation mechanism embedded. For test 
purposes a specific mobile health application, namely SapoFit, was used. 
Cryptographic mechanisms were created and integrated in SapoFit 
application with built in cooperation mechanisms. A performance 
evaluation of both approaches in a real scenario with different mobile 
devices is performed and presented in this work. A comparison with the 












Mobile Health, m-Health, Mobile computing, Cryptography, 













Acknowledgements ..................................................... i	  
Abstract .................................................................. iii	  
Keywords ................................................................. v	  
Contents ................................................................ vii	  
List of Figures ........................................................... xi	  
Acronyms .............................................................. xiii	  
1.	   Introduction ....................................................... 1	  
1.1. Focus ........................................................................ 1	  
1.2. Problem Definition ........................................................ 6	  
1.3. Objectives .................................................................. 6	  
1.4. Main Contributions ........................................................ 7	  
1.5. Dissertation Structure ................................................... 8	  
2.	   Related Work ................................................... 11	  
2.1.	   Mobile health (m-Health) ............................................ 12	  
2.1.1.	   Electronic Health Records ....................................... 16	  
2.1.2.	   Health Level Seven International (HL7) ....................... 17	  
2.2. e-Health data privacy and protection .............................. 20	  
2.3.	   An Overview of Cryptographic Approaches ...................... 23	  
2.3.1.	   Confidentiality ..................................................... 23	  




2.3.3. Authenticity .......................................................... 26	  
2.4. Summary .................................................................. 27	  
3.	   Requirement Analysis ......................................... 29	  
3.1. Essential Requirements ................................................ 30	  
3.2. Behavioural Diagrams .................................................. 30	  
3.2.1. Use Case Diagrams .................................................. 31	  
3.2.2. Activity Diagrams ................................................... 31	  
3.3. Interaction Diagrams ................................................... 33	  
3.3.1. Sequence Diagrams ................................................. 34	  
3.4. Used Technologies ...................................................... 36	  
3.5. Android Platform ........................................................ 37	  
3.6. Summary .................................................................. 39	  
4.	   Ubiquitous Cryptographic Solutions ........................ 41	  
4.1. Cooperation Mechanisms .............................................. 41	  
4.2. Data Encryption for Mobile Health Applications (DE4MHA) ..... 45	  
4.2.1. Public Key Message ................................................. 47	  
4.2.2. Session Key Message ................................................ 48	  
4.2.3. Symmetric Algorithm Choice ...................................... 50	  
4.2.4. Asymmetric Algorithm Choice ..................................... 52	  
4.2.5. Integrity and Authenticity ......................................... 52	  
4.3. Enhanced Cryptography Solution for m-Health Applications in 
Cooperative Environments (eC4MHA) ..................................... 53	  
4.3.1. Assuring Data Confidentiality ..................................... 53	  
4.3.2. Integrity and Authenticity ......................................... 55	  
4.3.3. Key Management .................................................... 56	  
4.4. Summary .................................................................. 57	  
5.	   Performance Evaluation and System Validation ......... 59	  
5.1. SapoFit Application ..................................................... 59	  
5.2. M-Health Network Scenario ........................................... 60	  




5.3.1. DE4MHA Performance Analysis .................................... 63	  
5.3.2. eC4MHA Performance Analysis .................................... 66	  
5.3.3. DE4MHA and eC4MHA Comparison ................................ 67	  
5.4. Summary .................................................................. 69	  
6.	   Conclusions and Future Work ............................... 71	  
6.1. Conclusions ............................................................... 71	  
6.2. Future Work .............................................................. 73	  
References ............................................................. 75	  









List of Figures 
 
 
FIGURE 1 - GENERAL MOBILE HEALTH SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE. ................................................ 2	  
FIGURE 2 – ILLUSTRATION OF A COOPERATION SCENARIO. ..................................................... 4	  
FIGURE 3 – ILLUSTRATION OF A TYPICAL EHR MOBILE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE. ............................... 16	  
FIGURE 4 - HL7 HISTORY. .................................................................................. 18	  
FIGURE 5 – ILLUSTRATION OF AN HL7 INTERFACE MODEL. ................................................... 19	  
FIGURE 6 – GENERAL SYMMETRIC ALGORITHMS PROCESSING SEQUENCE. ...................................... 24	  
FIGURE 7 - DIGITAL SIGNATURE. ............................................................................ 27	  
FIGURE 8 - APPLICATION USE CASE DIAGRAM. ............................................................... 31	  
FIGURE 9 - DE4MHA ACTIVITY DIAGRAM. ................................................................... 32	  
FIGURE 10 - EC4MHA ACTIVITY DIAGRAM. .................................................................. 33	  
FIGURE 11 – DE4MHA SEQUENCE DIAGRAM. ................................................................ 34	  
FIGURE 12 - EC4MHA SEQUENCE DIAGRAM. ................................................................ 35	  
FIGURE 13 - ANDROID OS ARCHITECTURE. .................................................................. 37	  
FIGURE 14 – ILLUSTRATION OF THE COOPERATIVE LIST. ...................................................... 42	  
FIGURE 15 - ILLUSTRATION OF THE INTERACTION FOR AN M.HEALTH APPLICATION WITH THE COOPERATION 
APPROACH FOR 4 USERS. ............................................................................. 44	  
FIGURE 16 - DATA EXCHANGE SEQUENCE. ................................................................... 47	  
FIGURE 17 - PUBLIC KEY MESSAGE. ......................................................................... 48	  
FIGURE 18 - SESSION KEY MESSAGE. ........................................................................ 49	  
FIGURE 19 - AVERAGE TIME ENCRYPTION. .................................................................. 51	  
FIGURE 20 - AVERAGE TIME DECRYPTION. .................................................................. 51	  
FIGURE 21 - ILLUSTRATION OF KEY EXCHANGE SEQUENCE ON EC4MHA. ..................................... 54	  
FIGURE 22 - EC4MHA TYPICAL WORKFLOW. ................................................................ 56	  
FIGURE 23 - THREE MAIN ACTIVITIES SCREENSHOTS OF SAPOFIT APPLICATION: LOGIN, PLANS, AND USER 
PROFILE. ............................................................................................. 60	  
FIGURE 24 - ILLUSTRATION OF THE NETWORK SCENARIO FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE EC4MHA. .. 61	  
FIGURE 25 - MOBILE DEVICES USED FOR TRIALS WITH THE SAPOFIT M-HEALTH APPLICATION. ................. 62	  
FIGURE 26 - SERVICE DELIVERY PROBABILITY WITH AND WITHOUT DE4MHA. ............................... 64	  
FIGURE 27 - SERVICE AVERAGE DELAY WITH AND WITHOUT DE4MHA. ...................................... 64	  
FIGURE 28 - SERVICE DELIVERY PROBABILITY WITH AND WITHOUT EC4MHA. ................................ 66	  
FIGURE 29 - SERVICE AVERAGE DELAY WITH AND WITHOUT EC4MHA. ...................................... 67	  
FIGURE 30 - SERVICE AVERAGE DELAY WITH DE4MHA AND EC4MHA. ...................................... 68	  













3DES : Triple Data Encryption Standard 
ACT : Achieved Cooperation Time 
ADT : Android Developer Tools 
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard 
ANSI : American National Standards Institute 
API : Application Programming Interface 
BAN : Body Area Network 
BMI : Body Mass Index 
BMR : Basal Metabolic Rate 
BT : Bluetooth 
CATV : Cable Television 
CDA : Clinical Document Architecture 
CFB : Cipher Feedback Mode 
CSCW : Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
CWS : Cooperative Web Service 
DE4MHA : Data Encryption for Mobile Health Applications 
DES : Data Encryption Standard 
DSA : Digital Signature Algorithm 
DVM : Dalvik Virtual Machine 
eC4MHA : Enhanced Cryptography Solution for Mobile Health 
Applications 
EHR : Electronic Health Record 
GPS : Global Positioning System 




HTTP : Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPs : Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
IDE : Integration Development Environment 
IDEA : International Data Encryption Algorithm 
IIHI : Individually Identifiable Health Information 
JCA : Java Cryptography Architecture 
JMIR : Journal of Medical Internet Research 
JSE : Java Cryptography Extension 
JSP : Java Server Pages 
MD5 : Message Digest 5 
NCM : Node Control Message 
NetGNA : Next Generation Networks and Applications Group 
OMG : Object Management Group 
OS : Operating System 
PGP : Pretty Good Privacy 
PHR : Personal Health Record 
PKM : Public Key Message 
RBAC : Role-Based Access Control 
RC4 : Rivest Cipher 4 
RCM : Requester Control Message 
REST : Representational State Transfer 
RIM : Reference Information Model 
RL : Reputation List 
RN : Requester Node 
RSA : Rivest Shamir Adleman 
SAML : Security Assertion Markup Language  
SDK : Software Development Kit 
SHA-1 : Secure Hash Algorithm 1 
SKM : Session Key Message 
SOA : Service Oriented Architecture 
SSL : Secure Socket Layer 




WBAN : Wireless Body Area Network 
WLAN : Wireless Local Area Network 
WS : Web Service 
XACML : eXtensible Access Control Markup Language  















Health telematics remains as a central point in everyday society’s 
life and its importance has an enormous impact on people daily life. The 
need to provide health services regardless time and place has being 
increasing the mobile health applications growth and dissemination, 
changing many social and medical realities [1]. Currently, mobile 
computing faces a new trend in electronic health, due to the remarkable 
growing of ubiquity services, presenting never before given opportunities 
[2]. It has coming to offer more accessible and affordable healthcare 
solutions to patients that live in remote rural areas, that travel constantly 
or that are physically incapacitated [3], with particular incidence in 
developing countries [4]. Hence, health telematics are becoming a major 
improvement in patient’s lives, especially those who are disabled, elderly 
and chronically ill. Telemedicine includes the use of medical information, 
also known as Electronic Health Records (EHR), exchanged electronically to 
improve the patient’s health status [5]. This growing was analogue to the 
rapidly evolution of IT infrastructures and rapid access to patient data. The 
Web 2.0 concept and the emerging Web 3.0 is offering to healthcare 
professionals opportunities never given before [6]. For instance, physicians 
can now share medical videos (YouTube), photos (Flickr), and presentations 
(Slideshare), use blogs for posting medical cases and images, share hospital 
management information, use social networking to share ideas and tasks as 




specific interests. With the advent of mobile communications supported on 
smart mobile devices that uses 3G and 4G mobile networks for data 
transport, mobile computing has been the main attraction of research and 
business communities. Thus, they offer countless opportunities to create 
efficient mobile health solutions. Mobile health (m-Health) appears as the 
new edge on healthcare innovation and may be defined as the integration 
and utilization of health services in mobile technologies. It proposes to 
deliver healthcare anywhere and anytime, surpassing geographical, 
temporal, and even organizational barriers [7], [8]. Laxminarayan and 
Istepanian defined mobile health for the first time, in 2000, as the 
“unwired e-med”. In 2003, the term “m-Health” was defined as “emerging 
mobile communications and network technologies for healthcare systems” 
[9]. Figure 1 illustrates a typical mobile health system architecture, 
containing one or more monitoring and/or surveillance devices, such as 
mobile devices or wearable sensors, which should be connected to the 
Internet to allow information forwarding and storage. 
 
	  





















Laxminarayan et al. [10], in 2006, presents a comprehensive study 
about the impact of mobility on the existing e-Health commercial 
telemedical systems. Furthermore, it served as a basis for future m-Health 
technologies and services [11]. Several research topics related to health 
have gathered important findings and contributions from m-Health, such 
as, cardiology [12]-[14], diabetes [15], [16], obesity [17], [18], smoking 
cessation [19], among others. In the above-mentioned medical issues, m-
Health applications are applied for health monitoring, diseases prevention 
and detection, and, in more advanced services, also provide basic 
diagnosis. M-Health services are also becoming popular in developing 
countries [4], [20] where healthcare facilities are frequently remote and/or 
inaccessible. However, architectures based on mobile devices and wireless 
communications present several challenged issues and constraints, such as, 
battery and storage capacity, broadcast constraints, interferences, 
disconnections, noises, limited bandwidths, and network delays [21]. 
Research studies present cooperation-based approaches as a solution to 
solve such limitations and also to improve wireless networks performance 
[22], [23].  
In the healthcare context, cooperation among healthcare 
professionals has been studied and concluded that can improve their work 
and performance. Computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) is 
typically used to share information through broadband and 
telecommunication networks (e-Mail or instant messaging) [24]. However, 
CSCW applied to healthcare information systems could enable patients and 
healthcare professionals to work together and share more efficiently health 
information even from remote locations [25], [26]. 
In this sense, cooperation-based approaches [27], [28] are presented 
as a solution to solve such limitations, focusing on increasing network 
connectivity, communication rates and reliability. Hence, a cooperation 
strategy regarding m-Health applications has been proposed in [27]. It 
essentially focuses on forwarding and retrieving data to/from nodes that 




Figure 2. Thus, devices without Internet connection can use m-Health 




Figure 2 – Illustration of a cooperation scenario. 
 
Cooperation among mobile nodes may carry sensitive data, e.g., an 
application connected to a hospital monitoring vital signs of a patient or an 
application with diagnosis capabilities, represent scenarios where sensitive 
information carried by mobile nodes, through cooperation, in the network 
until it reaches its final destination, may possibly be compromised due to 
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cooperation among mobile nodes raises issues regarding user’s health data 
privacy and protection. Furthermore, with the existence and dissemination 
of mobile devices as well as the high increase of health applications 
designed for mobile devices, currently brings issues that should be carefully 
addressed.  
Advances in mobile health data exchange are currently being 
developed by Health Level Seven International (HL7), mobile health 
working group [29]. It creates and promotes health information technology 
standards and frameworks for mobile health, focusing on how data should 
be structured and properly secured for transmission over the network. 
However, and despite the efforts, this working group is still on an early 
stage of standards development, resulting in a lack of official standards for 
commercial use. In this sense, cryptographic algorithms are presented as an 
alternative and at the same time as a solution to the above mentioned 
security concerns. Due to the advent and evolution of current mobile 
devices, cryptographic algorithms are now capable of accomplishing its 
tasks without the concern of mobile resources that could decrease the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the network, degrading the mobile 
application user experience or even compromising cooperative gains in a 
cooperative scenario. 
Protecting data from being disclosed, in its essence, boils down to 
the encryption process by making data unreadable for humans and/or 
machines. Furthermore, data exchange in such type of network must 
comprehend, among others, criteria like data confidentiality (data may be 
sensitive), data integrity (data may be altered during transmission), 
authentication (entities in communications have to prove their true entity), 
or non-repudiation (after a message being sent, the sender should not be 
able to deny it) [30]. 
Privacy’s data protection for mobile health applications in a 
cooperative environment is the main topic of this dissertation and it will be 





1.2. Problem Definition 
 
In a typical m-Health system, information is exchanged between 
several entities, raising concerns about information privacy and protection. 
Such type of information may be considered as sensitive information and 
should not be made available to any other than authorized sources. Leak of 
information compromises patient’s health data privacy and it may be used 
for secondary or improper use. Moreover, with the advent of mobile 
devices and, consequently, mobile health applications, the need to assure 
information privacy and protection is definitely a critical aspect for such 
applications. Cooperation mechanisms, as already stated, tend to be a 
current solution to guarantee overall connectivity, namely, in a mobile 
scenario. This approach raises few concerns regarding the information 
flowing among nodes through cooperation. Hence, the main problem 
approached in this dissertation refers to assure that all information flowing 
on the network through cooperation is protected from undisclosed sources, 




The main objective of this dissertation is the performance evaluation 
of available cryptographic mechanisms to present a consistent and robust 
solution for mobile health applications in cooperative environments. It 
essentially focuses on guarantying that health data from mobile 
applications is not compromised or disclosed to unauthorized or unwanted 
entities, while transmitted from mobile node to mobile node through 
cooperation. Hence, cryptographic mechanisms can be used to provide 
secure packet forwarding on the network, ensuring user health data 






To accomplish this main objective, the following intermediate 
objectives were identified: 
 
§ A detailed study of the state-of-the-art in cryptography, 
approaches and its challenges, as well as the study of 
cooperation mechanisms for m-Health applications, along with 
the necessary review of mobile health and security issues related 
to e-Health; 
 
§ The system requirements analysis in order to fetch all the system 
requirements; 
 
§ Proposal and deployment of cryptographic solutions over 
cooperation mechanisms; 
 
§ Performance evaluation and validation of the proposed 
cryptographic mechanisms using a real prototype. 
 
 
1.4. Main Contributions 
 
This section is devoted to the scientific contributions of this 
dissertation to the state-of-the-art on mobile and ubiquitous health as well 
as on secure health data exchange through cryptographic mechanisms. 
The first contribution presents a data encryption solution for mobile 
health applications (DE4MHA) with cooperation strategy for m-Health 
Applications. It aims to present a robust solution based on Encryption 
algorithms that guaranty the best confidentiality and protection of users 
health information. This contribution was published in the Journal of 
Medical Internet Research (JMIR) [31]. 
The second contribution of this dissertation is a performance 




cooperative environment, including the proposal of a novel and enhanced 
cryptography solution in a cooperative environment called eC4MHA. This 
proposal aims to face the challenges related to privacy and security issues 
of all forwarded and retrieved data concerning user sensitive information in 
mobile health systems under a cooperative environment. A paper with this 
contribution was submitted to the IEEE Global Communications Conference 
(IEEE GLOBECOM 2013), Atlanta, USA, December 09-13, 2013.  The paper is 
under review. 
 
1.5. Dissertation Structure 
 
This dissertation is organized in six chapters. This chapter, the first, 
starts with focus of the dissertation addressing the topic under study, 
identifies the research problem, defines the objectives, presents main 
contributions as well the dissertation structure itself. 
Chapter 2 elaborates about the related work, approaching the 
literature on mobile health, including a brief review about ubiquitous 
health systems, focusing on the importance of ubiquity and usability. Then, 
cryptographic mechanisms are approached, along with some related work 
about health data exchange involving cryptographic solutions. 
Chapter 3 approaches the requirements analysis for the 
cryptographic system presenting the essential requirements, UML diagrams 
(behavioural, interaction and structural diagrams), and the used 
technologies. 
Chapter 4 addresses the considered cryptographic solutions. First, 
the cooperation mechanisms are shortly introduced along with the 
respective cryptographic measures that were applied. Next, the chapter 
focus on the cryptographic system architecture of the two proposed 
approaches. 
Chapter 5 presents the performance evaluation and validation of the 
solutions. It presents a short presentation of the mobile health application 





focuses on the performance evaluation and validation of both considered 
solutions, which includes a comparison between them. 
Finally, Chapter 6, summarizes all the work performed in this 
dissertation, considering the main conclusions of this work and suggestions 












2. Related Work 
 
In order to focus the scope of this dissertation, it is important to 
present some related work about the topic. Mobile health applications have 
been facing a considerable growth, much because of the also growth and 
acceptance of mobile technologies, namely smartphones and tablets. As an 
example, in the United States of America, 52% of smartphone owners have 
used their smartphones to look up for health info, whether through Internet 
researches or through usage of mobile health applications [32]. As mobile 
health applications evolve, more sophisticated and advanced health 
applications emerge, raising concerns about health data privacy and 
protection. Over the years, several attempts to standardize the way health 
data is exchanged between patients and doctors have appeared. In addition 
to the information structuration, that may enable easier and faster analysis 
by medical entities, it is also necessary to focus on assuring information 
privacy and security, once health information is in most cases sensitive 
information.   
This chapter presents the related literature to mobile health in 
Section 2.1, approaching the different ways of structuring health 
information, in order to provide standard formats to transmit such type of 
data. In Section 2.2, security aspects are presented regarding e-Health, 
considering approaches that include privacy and protection of e-Health 
data. Section 2.3 briefly presents some cryptographic mechanisms, 
enumerating several efficient, and effective algorithms to perform 







2.1. Mobile health (m-Health) 
 
Over the years mobile health technology has been facing a 
tremendous development, given opportunities regarding patient’s health 
monitoring and treatment never seen before [33]. Although healthcare 
information systems are more suitable and designed for professionals to 
manage patients health records, mobile health has being offering to those 
who are isolated from healthcare facilities, new opportunities regarding 
their health status prevention and treatment. Elderly population is one of 
the most affected by isolation and displacement incapacities. Hence, 
mobile health is presented as an excellent solution for them. These people 
often underestimates diseases like hypertension and oversights that may 
cause several damage if not properly monitored for prevention and 
treatment awareness [34]. Through mobile health, data can be collected 
from patient’s mobile devices (e.g. smartphones or wearable sensors) and 
sent to healthcare providers, enabling a remote and fast analysis avoiding 
patient’s displacement.  
Mobile technology has being registered a progressive evolution due 
to the growing ubiquity of those devices. Over the years, several definitions 
of ubiquitous computing have been proposed. One of the most widely cited 
definitions regarding ubiquitous computing [35] comes from Mark Weiser: 
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave 
themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable 
from it”. In its essence, its goal is to provide users services available 
anytime and anywhere in a transparent manner, focusing in the information 
perceived by the user instead of the technology behind responsible for its 
operation [36], [37]. As it was already stated, mobile devices suffer from 
certain restrictions, namely their processing capacity, turning them 





processing tasks [38]. Hence, the development of ubiquitous Web-based 
systems has come to handle these limitations, releasing the mobile devices 
from running these heavy tasks, providing them access to remote services 
and content, regardless the time and place in a transparent manner. 
Ubiquitous computing may be present whether on client side (e.g. mobile 
device) or even in server side (e.g. Web Service). It offers invisible 
mechanisms, in a transparent way to the end-user. All the interactions with 
software and/or hardware happens without being noticed by the end-user 
[39]. As an example of a ubiquitous system used anywhere is the Internet 
itself, in which several services can be used in an invisible way. It helps 
users to maintain information (e.g. medical records), giving them the 
possibility to handle and access their information anywhere around the 
globe [37]. Ubiquitous health is also present in the use of body area 
networks (BANs) to make possible to ubiquitously monitor physical and 
physiological parameters [40]. In this type of system, also known as 
wireless body area networks (WBANs), data is collected through sensors, 
which is then ubiquitously sent and stored for later analysis by medical 
staff or even the patient itself. Data access may be accomplished through a 
neutral approach (e.g. a Web browser) [41]. A similar approach [42] 
deployed a long term healthcare system, in which a wireless local area 
network (WLAN) and a Cable Television (CATV) are used in a form of a 
ubiquitous network, allowing for patient physiological monitoring. Although 
ubiquitous systems present significant improvements, regarding health 
topic concerns, many ethical and privacy questions are raised as referred in 
[43]. Issues like knowing who owns the health information, who is allowed 
to access it, the way it is stored, and who is responsible for its 
management, are all matters that some users may have concerns about 
ubiquitous health care systems. In order to allow the natural grow of 
ubiquitous health systems and mobile applications, it is important to 





Due to devices ubiquity as well as due to mobile devices 
proliferation [44] several health applications have been developed and 
made world wide available to the public through online markets [45]. They 
offer to users the possibility of monitoring their own health state, by 
creating and maintaining their own health records, treatments alerts, 
health goals establishment, just to name a few. All these types of 
applications are present in many popular mobile platforms, such as Google 
Android OS [46], iOS [47], Symbian OS [48], and Windows Phone OS [49] 
with theirs respective applications stores, such as the Google Play [50] 
(formerly Google Android Market), App Store [51], Ovi Store [52] and 
Windows Phone Store [53], among others. Android OS is one of the 
preferred targets in what health applications concerns, with several 
applications available, like Stabilix PHR [54], that allows users to manage a 
personal health record. Another example is the Fast Food Calorie Counter 
[55] in which users can be aware of what they eat, or CardioTrainer [56] 
that makes use of GPS to keep track of the distance walked by the user, 
returning some performance information, as the calories burned in the 
walk. Regarding iOS concerns, Restaurant Nutrition [57] is an application 
that allows users to view nutritional information about restaurants menu 
and track what they have eaten. Capzule PHR [58] works as a personal 
health record for all the family, along with health in family [59] for 
Symbian. Lately, Windows Phone has been facing an increase of popularity 
among users, in which thousands of applications are being available 
everyday. Emergency Kit [60], it is an application that allows storing the 
blood type, allergies medications and emergency contacts. In case of an 
emergency, technicians will be able to view user’s health stats in a 
heartbeat. On the other hand, SapoFit [61] is a Google Android OS 
application that intends to be a more complete solution for obesity 
prevention and treatment. The use of Web services allows the system to be 
used anytime and anywhere. For integration and experiments of the 
cryptographic mechanisms, this application was used. However, more 





Last approaches face several challenges, such as remote data 
collection, which may result in several problems regarding patient’s health 
information structuration for efficient analysis as well as privacy and 
security issues. Poorly structured information may cause healthcare 
professionals to spent more time than required for data analysis as well as 
to misinterpret collected data, making the use of standards extremely 
important [62]. Furthermore, data retrieval from mobile applications is 
exposed to several threats while being collected or transmitted between 
several agents over the network. If all the necessary security requirements 
are not carefully addressed, e.g., assuring that all the collected data is 
kept confidential and their integrity untouchable, collected data may 
possible be compromised, eventually resulting in an improper or secondary 
use of such data. 
Mobile health services are present in a large scale in the applications 
available to users, allowing them to obtain useful information about their 
health care, serving as well as prevention awareness. Furthermore, mobile 
health is commonly used in telemedicine allowing, such as, personal health 
care, remote management, and patient’s health status monitoring [63]. A 
proper structuration of such information along with its security and privacy 
becomes an essential point. In [64], some challenges and limitations on m-
Health systems are presented, namely the lack of standards regarding the 
standardization to link telemedicine services, due to difficult operational 
compatibilities between mobile devices and telecommunications services. 
Moreover, it is stated that due to system privacy and security issues, user 
acceptance tends to grow up slowly. 
Electronic health records (EHRs) and health level seven international 
(HL7) protocols can be considered as a solution, allowing efficient 
information structuration, enabling easier interpretation of such 






2.1.1. Electronic Health Records 
 
A common way for healthcare providers to usually store health 
information is electronic health records (EHRs) [65]. An EHR is essentially a 
representation of health information in an electronic format [66]. It 
enables faster and more convenient access by physicians or medical staff. A 
typical EHR system is based on a well structured and organized archive 
regarding the patient medical history in an electronic form [67]. An EHR 
presents several advantages regarding health information structuration, 
namely the capacity to improve health providers efficiency, reducing costs 
or even increasing treatments effectiveness [68]. Moreover, it allows 
medical staff or patients to easily access that information in an electronic 
way providing to the medical staff enhanced abilities to make improved 
decisions about possible health treatments or analysis to the patients 
health information [69]. An illustration of a typical EHR mobile system 
architecture [70] may be seen in Figure 3. 
 
 












 EHR-based mobile applications are currently gaining popularity due 
to the fact that users access their health information through the Web, not 
being constrained to spatial and temporal barriers, although it is necessary 
a reliable Internet connection in order to support these services [71]. 
Mobile-EHR (m-EHR) systems rely on the utilization of Web Services that 
enable the access to data from any personal computer, tablet, or 
smartphone with Internet connection [72].  
Current limitations regarding EHR adoptions among patients, include 
the above-mentioned issues related to information privacy and potential 
security concerns [73], mainly due to the fact that EHR may hold sensitive 
information. Another drawback in the utilization of EHR systems regards 
interoperability. Achieving interoperability between systems using EHR 
systems managed by different healthcare providers still presents slowly and 
expensive tasks [74]. In this sense, HL7 is presented as a standard with 
main goal directed to achieving interoperability among systems with 
different healthcare providers. 
 
2.1.2. Health Level Seven International (HL7) 
 
Health level seven international (HL7) is a non-profit, ANSI-
accredited standards developing organization, that intends to deliver and 
provide a framework and related standards for the exchange, integration, 
and retrieval of electronic health information [75]. HL7 was created in 1987 
in the United States of America. In its essence, HL7 protocol is a set of 
protocols specifying how electronic health data should be exchanged in 
healthcare environments, between computer applications that may belong 
to different manufacturers. Information sent through HL7 standards is sent 
as a collection of one or more messages, in which each one of them carries 
health information (records), e.g., patient records or laboratory records.  
Over the years, its strategy has been refined, as may be seen in the 
different versions that have come out, as illustrated on Figure 4. The 




information model (RIM) [76]. It basically allows specifying the information 
content of messages, through an information model that clarifies 
definitions ensuring that they are used consistently. While HL7 v2 provides 
a negotiated framework for developers to easily use and adapt, v3 was 
targeted for being a stricter standard that aimed to eliminate variances, in 





Figure 4 - HL7 history. 
 
HL7 v3 is based on messages and aims to be easily interpreted and 
processed by machines. On the other hand, HL7 has developed the clinical 
document architecture (CDA), that is a generic message structure to be 
able to exchange clinical documents, based on the HL7 RIM, but unlike the 
HL7 v3 protocol, its main goal is to assure effective and better human 
readability, although it was developed for being easily interpreted and 
processed by machines as well. The CDA is structured in eXtensible markup 
language (XML) and it specifies the semantic structure of how a clinical 
document, with exchange purposes, should be codified. It is the base 
model of any clinical document that may be exchanged between different 
entities.   
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HL7 has been offering a standardized way of exchanging e-Health 
data among machines or devices that deploy and follow the HL7 protocol. 
Through a protocol like HL7, different machines from different vendors can 
communicate through a standard interface, allowing to add new machines 
without modifying the original source system, as may be seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Illustration of an HL7 Interface model. 
 
Although HL7 protocols specify conveniently how data should be 
properly structured, several security issues arise. Through HL7 protocols 
health information is carried and, as above-mentioned, such information 
may be sensitive. Fortunately, HL7 organization offers guides to identify 
and solve potential security issues. One of the recommendations of HL7 is 
to use the secure socket layer (SSL) to encrypt communications between 













encrypted link between a given server and a client, usually a Web server 
(Website) and a browser. It uses asymmetric cryptography for key exchange 
authentication, symmetric encryption for confidentiality, and message 
authentication codes for message integrity (Cryptography will be more 
detailed in section 2.3). This approach prevents data disclosure when 
attempts to sniff HL7 network traffic occur. Furthermore, HL7 organization 
has been creating its own standards regarding privacy and security, like the 
role based access control (RBAC) method that essentially controls access to 
resources on an information system, or the CDA consent directive, that 
defines privacy policies on how individually identifiable health information 
(IIHI) should be collected, accessed, used, and disclosed. Although those 
standards should come to offer a uniformed and unique way of exchanging 
information, with a standard structure following privacy and security 
standards, its employment requires a long and slow period of time in order 
to be able to perfectly understand and apply such standards.   
Lately and largely due to the advent of mobile health technology, 
HL7 decided the creation of a working group, focusing on developing and 
promoting standards for e-Health data exchange towards mobile health 
technology. It follows the same principles as the previous standards, i.e., it 
focuses on interoperability. Unfortunately, this working group is still in an 
early phase of development, as there are yet no available standards for 
commercial use. Originally, HL7 standards were intended to be used in the 
context of this dissertation but the lack of available standards for mobile 
technology motivated other approaches for this study. 
 
2.2. e-Health data privacy and protection 
 
Over the years, concerns about securing e-Health data has been a 
matter with great importance, mainly due to the sensitivity of data 
exchanged between users [78]. Since m-Health applications may carry 
sensitive health data about patients (e.g., infectious diseases such as HIV), 





to all of these issues when developing m-Health applications, in order to 
ensure that user’s health data privacy is not compromised. One of the most 
common solutions to handle security issues in such cases is cryptography 
[79]. In [80], it is proposed an architecture that allows exchanging patients’ 
medical record in a secure way through the existing infrastructure of 
mobile operators. Generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) is used to 
enable user authentication, while the other entity in the communication 
(service provider, hospital, and network operator) authenticates through 
usage of public key infrastructure (PKI). To guarantee a secure 
communication, encryption, and digital signature techniques are used. 
In [81], it is presented an approach to protect data considering a 
scenario composed by a user with wearable sensors with the possibility of 
transmitting collected data not only from the sensors to a mobile phone 
(through Bluetooth), enabling vital signs monitoring and analysis, but also 
from the mobile phone to trusted medical professionals. In order to assure 
confidentiality of the data transmitted between a mobile phone to trusted 
devices, authors do not rely on the security provided by Bluetooth and 
WLAN technologies, applying instead the AES algorithm with a key size of 
128 bits, in combination with message authentication codes. For data 
transmission in a secure way, it is necessary to establish a mutual 
authentication between the user’s mobile phone and the trusted devices, 
which is achieved using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol for 
session key agreement, assuring this way a safe session key transfer.  
In [82], authors describe a new trend in security of e-Health data, 
presenting XML security solutions, describing some selected solutions in 
health data. eXtensible access control markup language (XACML) and 
security assertion markup language (SAML) are presented, enabling 
authentication and authorization in a large network space. SAML enables 
transmission of authentication data between parties, namely between an 
identity provider and a service provider. XACML defines access control 
policies and a processing model, describing how to evaluate authorization 




Another approach regarding secure e-Health data retrieval and 
transmission is proposed in [83], within a context where mobile phones can 
be used from anywhere to access health information stored in remote 
databases. To secure transmitted information from/to the remote 
databases, a policy regarding who may access such information is employed 
using authentication and access control. Authentication is based upon the 
types of users authorized to use the m-Health application, by providing a 
secured username and password. To provide the necessary security on 
transmitted data, an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm is used, 
encrypting data retrieved from the database, which is then sent to the 
mobile phone through wireless and decrypting it on the mobile application. 
 The above-mentioned approaches present features required in an m-
Health scenario, essentially covering scenarios where an m-Health 
application running on a mobile device, retrieves or transmits information 
from/to remote databases, using service oriented architectures (SOAs). All 
the above-mentioned approaches essentially focus on the use of 
cryptographic mechanisms, by primarily using techniques of encryption to 
assure data confidentiality. To guarantee that retrieved and collected data 
it is not modified, an awareness of such modifications should be provided, 
which is also considered in last approaches by using signature techniques. 
However, some limitations arise, specifically the first one suffers from 
mobile operator dependency, while the third one is focused towards 
systems exchanging data in XML format. Furthermore, cooperative 
scenarios present their own specific features and limitations, such as node 
misbehaviour, connections loss, or even different formats of data 
exchange, requiring special care. Thus, a comprehensive study of 
cooperation mechanisms becomes an important step towards the 
development and application of effective and efficient cryptographic 
mechanisms. Next section provides an awareness of cryptography to better 
understand in what exactly consists, as well the several existing algorithms 







2.3. An Overview of Cryptographic Approaches 
 
Cryptographic mechanisms have proven to be a promising solution 
for several security issues in wireless networks, as may be stated in the 
above-given examples. In this sense, cryptography may be defined as a set 
of techniques that tries to assure safe communication between two agents, 
on an open channel. It essentially tries to give an answer to numerous 
proprieties of the communication process like confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity [84]. This section will focus on briefly describing the above-
mentioned properties. It will also enumerate several cryptographic 




Confidentiality consists in protecting data within a message from 
being available or disclosed to unauthorized persons [85]. Therefore, 
referring confidentiality, it implies dealing with encryption. Encryption can 
be defined as the process of encoding messages in a manner that no one 
else but authorized parties should be able to read. On the other hand, it 
exists the decryption procedure, which is the inverse process of encryption, 
i.e., it consists in decoding the encrypted message, in order to obtain its 
original content. Hence, several algorithms were developed and presented 
over the past decades to deal with the increasing need of assuring data 
confidentiality, and they may be split into two main groups, i) symmetric 
algorithms where both encryption and decryption is accomplished using the 
same key, and ii) asymmetric algorithms, where one key is used to encrypt 








2.3.1.1. Symmetric Algorithms 
 
 Several well-known symmetric key encryption algorithms and 
enumerated in [86] have been examined, namely: data encryption standard 
(DES), triple data encryption standard (3DES), advanced encryption 
standard (AES), blowfish, international data encryption algorithm (IDEA) 
and Rivest cipher 4 (RC4). To present an overview of how these types of 
algorithms operate, DES algorithm can be used as example. It operates on a 
64 bits data block and a fixed key length of 56 bits size for 16 rounds, i.e., 
it splits the original data in fixed blocks of 56 bits applying then 16 rounds 




Figure 6 – General symmetric algorithms processing sequence. 
 
Nowadays, it is considered out-dated and it has been replaced by its 
successor 3DES, that essentially consists in applying DES algorithm three 
times rather than one, supporting 112 bits or 168 bits key of length, and a 
block size of 64 bits, that operates on 48 rounds and it is, therefore, 
considered to be inefficient. On the other hand, AES algorithm operates on 
a block cipher of 128 bits size and the key size is 128, 192 or 256 bits [87]. 
AES is a 10,12 or 16 rounds iterative cipher that uses byte substitution, row 
shifting, column mixing and key addition presenting a fast 















 RC4 also known as ARC4 or ARCFOUR, was designed by Ron Rivest in 
1987 and uses a variable key length, i.e. from 40 to 256 bits, as well 
variable block size, what makes its speed in encryption/decryption varies. 
Secure socket layer (SSL) handshake protocol uses RC4 to encrypt/decrypt 
traffic to and from Web Sites. Finally, IDEA it is best known for its use in 
pretty good privacy (PGP) v2.0. It is an algorithm that operates on a 64 bits 
block size with a 128 bits key size. 
 
2.3.1.2. Asymmetric Algorithms 
 
These type of algorithms, also known as public key cryptography, 
solve some of the faults of the symmetric algorithms, such as the obligation 
of using the same key between two parties to encrypt/decrypt, although 
they are considered to be at least one thousand times slower than 
symmetric ones [88]. Keys size have to be significantly bigger (e.g. a 1024 
bits key of an asymmetric algorithm, corresponds approximately to a 128 
bits key of a symmetric algorithm) and it is usually harder to handle key 
management [89]. These types of algorithms are normally used with 
identification purposes or to session key exchange, without requiring a 
trust agent. RSA [90] is an example of an asymmetric algorithm and its 
name stands for Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, the founders of the referred 
algorithm. It is widely known by being appropriated to encrypt/decrypt as 
well to perform digital signature. It was proposed in the late 70’s but it is 
still used nowadays. Another example of asymmetric algorithm is Elgamal 





Integrity aims to provide an awareness of the correctness and 




absence of any change in such data after update or transmission [92]. As an 
example, health information is known as sensitive information in which a 
small change of the original information may have a negative outcome. 
Therefore it is usually a good idea to use algorithms that can assure us that 
we’re handling unchanged and original information. Hence, cryptographic 
hash functions are used for that purpose. Message digest 5 (MD5) [93] 
designed by Ron Rivest is a largely used hash algorithm to check data 
integrity. It produces a 128 bits output called message digest. To check 
data integrity, the same fragment of data, must always produce the same 
message digest as output, though in rare cases it may produce the same 
message digest for different fragments of data [94]. Secure hash algorithm 
1 (SHA-1) [95] is another algorithm which main purpose it is to assure data 
integrity, producing a 160 bits message digest. Both algorithms allow 
checking data integrity, by computing the message digest of a certain 
message. Any change of the message, will almost certainly result in a 
different message digest, which allows checking if data integrity has been 




Authenticity is another important concept when handling with 
security mechanisms. Nowadays, in every system, it is vital to assure that 
we’re communicating or receiving information from the expected source. 
Therefore authenticity can be achieved using an asymmetric algorithm like 
the above-mentioned RSA algorithm, in combination with a hash function, 
in which the private key is used to encrypt the message digest produced by 
MD5 hash algorithm. Then, the public key is used to decrypt the message 
digest, and when compared with the generated message digest on the 







Figure 7 - Digital Signature. 
  
Digital signature algorithm (DSA) [96] also provides digital signature 
capabilities. However DSA can only sign not providing encryption 
capabilities, furthermore it uses SHA-1 to generate the message digest as 
opposed to MD5 algorithm used by RSA. David Kravitz developed DSA and 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) adopted it as a 
Standard in 1991. 
The previous presented properties are usually the main features that 
should be addressed when attempting to provide security to some given 
data, whether or not a mobile environment is considered. The work 
presented in this dissertation focuses on the previous cryptographic 
approaches, by applying them to mobile health data in a cooperative 




This chapter presented the literature review concerning mobile 
health, ubiquitous health and cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, after a 
brief introduction, Section 2.1 presented the mobile health review along 
with a review on ubiquitous health regarding monitoring systems as well as 

































related work regarding e-Health data transmission between different 
entities focusing on data privacy and protection issues. Section 2.3 briefly 
presented some of the cryptographic mechanisms available, presenting 












3. Requirement Analysis 
 
Software development must always contain all specifications of the 
system to create. Therefore, requirement analysis, also called requirement 
engineering, is an essential part and its existence is mandatory to fully 
identify all system features and behaviours. 
The most used modelling specification is Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) managed by the Object Management Group (OMG). It provides 
suitable standard methods to model applications and data structure as well 
its behaviour, architecture and business process [97]. Although UML is not a 
software methodology or a programming language, it is a language with 
semantic notation that allows developers to view, specify, build and 
document the objects of a system that makes possible to design models, 
which consists in a set of a diagram with textual description that are 
consistent with each other. 
The system features and behaviours will be addressed in this chapter 
along with UML diagrams in order to demonstrate behaviours, interactions 
and the system architecture. 
Section 3.1 will approach the system essential requirements, 
Sections 3.2 to 3.4 will present behavioural, interaction and structural 
diagrams for both approaches (DE4MHA and eC4MHA) and Section 3.5 will 
address used technologies. In Section 3.5 is shortly presented the Android 








3.1. Essential Requirements 
 
One of the most relevant steps in requirement analysis is to 
determine essential requirements. They can be features or constraints, 
where the requirements that are mandatory to be present in the future 
system are established. Defining essential requirements can be a difficult 
task due to the need of having a global and complete vision of the future 
system to fully define these requirements. Hence, the following essential 
requirements were defined: 
 
§ Android API level should be equal or above 10 (i.e., Google Version 
equal or above 2.3.3), which represents 94,2% of the active 
Android devices across the globe [98]; 
§ Bluetooth hardware should be present; 
§ Wi-Fi or Edge/3.5G/4G modules are required; 
§ Cooperation mechanisms should work ubiquitously in the system; 
§ A pervasive Web Service is required in order to provide access and 
data management; 
§ Cryptographic mechanisms should works ubiquitously in the system 
and thus, completely invisible and transparent to the end user;  
 
In order to create and integrate the mobile cryptographic mechanisms, the 
above-defined essential requirements are required. 
 
3.2. Behavioural Diagrams 
 
Behavioural diagrams are used to represent system functionalities, 
i.e., it shows what must occur in the modelled system and it comprises use 







3.2.1. Use Case Diagrams 
 
Use case diagrams can be used to describe global system 
functionalities, by describing a set of actions (use cases) that the system 
(subject) should or can perform with one or more external user to the 
system (actor). The general use case diagram for the m-Health application 
is presented at Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Application use case diagram. 
 
 
3.2.2. Activity Diagrams 
 
Activity diagrams are widely used to provide a visualization of the 
system workflow. Two activity diagrams are defined regarding DE4MHA and 





























DE4MHA, that shows the secure health data retrieval workflow between 
mobile devices and the WS, when a node makes a service request.  
 
 
Figure 9 - DE4MHA activity diagram. 
 











































Figure 10 - eC4MHA activity diagram. 
 
3.3. Interaction Diagrams 
 
Interaction diagrams are used to describe interactions among 













































1) Node discovery and connection





3.3.1. Sequence Diagrams 
Sequence diagrams are useful to model the logic flow within a 
system perspective. They focus on identifying the system behaviour. In this 
work the system flow was divided in two relevant diagrams. The first one 
illustrated at Figure 11, presents the DE4MHA sequence diagram. 
 
 
Figure 11 – DE4MHA sequence diagram. 
 
loop
if [Requested Node cooperates]
[else]
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The next sequence diagram, presented in Figure 12, represents 
eC4MHA connection to WS for session key retrieval as well to health data 
retrieval, whether cooperation is required or not. 
 
 
Figure 12 - eC4MHA sequence diagram. 
 
if [Requester Node has Internet Connectivity]
if [Cooperative Node Found]
[else]
if [Requested Node has Internet Connectivity]
[else]
if [WS has no Session Key from such Requester Node]
[else]
Mobile Node Web Service
Send WS Public Key
Send session key encrypted 
w/ WS's Public Key
Send Acknowledgment
getUserHealthData()




Send Request Control Message
Send Request to WS
Send EncryptedResponse
Search process until 









3.4. Used Technologies 
 
The proposed cryptographic solutions aim mobile devices running 
Google Android operating system, shortly described in the next section. 
However, the proposed strategies could also be applied to other mobile 
operating systems, such as iOS or Windows Phone. Hence and in order to be 
possible to apply such mechanisms, Android Software Development Kit 
(SDK) [99] was used, which provides the necessary tools and a set of APIs to 
develop android applications using the Java programming language. More 
specifically, javax.crypto package was used to deal with the low levels of 
cryptography, enabling encryption, decryption and hashing operations. To 
manage the other aspects regarding cryptography, it was used the 
java.security package, which enables, among others, to handle key 
management and digital signature operations. Both packages are part of 
the Java cryptography architecture (JCA) or Java cryptography extension 
(JSE). 
The development tool used to develop the different proposed 
approaches with cryptographic mechanisms, was the Eclipse integration 
development environment (IDE) in combination with the Android 
development tools (ADT) plugin, designed to extend Eclipse capabilities, 
providing debugging options or even test emulators. 
The required modifications to the existing Cooperative Web Service 
(CWS) were accomplished with the original technology employed in the 
cooperation mechanisms, namely the Java Server Pages (JSP) technology 












3.5. Android Platform 
 
Google Android is a software stack for mobile devices that includes 
an operating system, middleware and key applications. The Android 
SDK provides the necessary and required tools and APIs to be able to 
develop applications for the Android platform, using the Java programming 
language. The following Figure 13 shows the main system components of 
the Android OS. 
 




























































The above shown components may be summarized as follows: 
 
§ Applications: Android OS provides by default a set of core 
applications, such as email client, phone dialler, messaging 
app, calendar, maps, browser, among other applications; 
 
§ Application Framework: Through this framework it is possible 
to access device hardware management options, as well access 
to the location information and other embedded android 
features; 
 
§ Libraries and Android Runtime: A set of libraries used by 
several components of the OS and explored by the application 
framework as well the Android Runtime, that comprises core 
libraries and the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) are included in 
the Android OS; 
 
§ Linux Kernel: The kernel handles core system services such as 
memory and process management, working as an abstract layer 
between the hardware and the software stack. 
 
Android possesses an activity stack that manages the different 
activities that an application may have. Given that an activity may be 
unexpectedly terminated, whether by the system or by the user, poses 
problems in the normal application functioning. Therefore having a 
reasonable knowledge of the Android architecture becomes mandatory in 
order to be possible to design and develop robust and consistent solutions 













In this chapter the requirement analysis were approached in order to 
address all system behaviours and necessary features to the system. Thus, 
Section 3.1 presented the essential requirements, Section 3.2 and 3.3 
focused and presented behavioural, interaction and sequence diagrams. 
Section 3.4 presented the used technologies in this work. Last, Section 3.5 












4. Ubiquitous Cryptographic 
Solutions 
 
In this chapter it will be focused the two proposed cryptographic 
solutions, regarding cooperation mechanisms security in a mobile 
environment. Hence, due to the fact that the created solutions aim mobile 
applications with built-in cooperation mechanisms, those will be shortly 
introduced and described in Section 4.1. Then, in Section 4.2, the first 
proposed solution (DE4MHA) is presented followed by an enhanced solution 
of the previous one (eC4MHA) in Section 4.3. 
 
4.1. Cooperation Mechanisms 
  
Cooperation mechanisms aim to assure that users of an m-Health 
system without WiFi or cellular network data connectivity, can access 
remote data through cooperation, requesting packet forwarding from 
nearby nodes and receiving data through Bluetooth. 
The cooperation strategy for m-Health applications with service 
oriented architectures (SOAs), is based on two mobile modules and one 
remote module: i) the node control message (NCM), ii) the requester 
control message (RCM) and iii) the cooperative web service (CWS). 
The mobile nodes control messages aim to provide an awareness of 
the relay node status, i.e., if the node is willing to cooperate and in what 
conditions. It contains the established node unique identifier, the battery 
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state, the Internet connectivity status, and the cooperation status (i.e., if 
its cooperative or not). 
The requester control message is first sent by the initial requester 
node (mobile device with m-Health application requesting health data), 
and it comprises five main components: 1) the requester ID, the node 
unique identifier; 2) the service request, i.e., what the node is specifically 
requesting (e.g., the login token or its health profile); 3) the neighbours 
list; 4) the reputation list; and 5) the achieved cooperation time (ACT). 
The network cooperative list illustrated in Figure 14 registers all 
cooperative and uncooperative network nodes throughout a service 
request. This list classifies all the neighbour nodes cooperative actions. It 
saves the Node ID and adds or subtracts a classification threshold according 
to the node cooperation status. When a service is requested from a node 




Figure 14 – Illustration of the cooperative list. 
 
 
The cooperative threshold list (CT) influences directly the node 








T = Total number of network nodes




according to the node cooperation status and node status. The correlation 
between the node cooperation status, the node status, its Internet 
connectivity and the resultant CT is it’s an important point regarding 
cooperation among mobile nodes.  
The node status is based on its storage capacity and energy lifetime. 
A node has three types of status: poor, regular, and excellent. A node with 
poor status is when the device storage capacity is over 95% or its available 
power energy is below 20%. The regular status when a node storage 
capacity is under 95% and its power energy is between 20% and 80%. A node 
is in an excellent status when the node storage capacity is under 95% and 
its available power energy is over 80%. The CT value guarantees that non-
cooperative nodes are punished. 
The cooperative Web service (CWS) includes and manages the node 
reputation table. To calculate nodes reputation, the CWS uses the 
cooperative lists deciding if the requesting node should have access to the 
m-Health application WS or not.  
Based on nodes reputation, the CWS will not grant access and 
release any resource from the WSs to selfish nodes. Selfish nodes are 
punished by the CWS with an order to cooperate until its reputation 
reaches a cooperative state. The CWS must always release resources to 
cooperative nodes, however, super-cooperative nodes have a maximum 
priority in case of simultaneous requests. Figure 15 presents a user scenario 
of the m-Health cooperation approach. User A has network connectivity 
and cooperates, the status value is according to the battery status. User B 
has network connectivity and does not cooperate. Then, the status value 
will suffer a negative impact according to the battery status. Users C and D 
do not have network connectivity. User C queries User A for cooperation 
and receives a positive response and all the requested data. User D queries 
User B for cooperation and receives a negative response. Then, User D 
requests data from User C that answers this request, getting positive status 
by cooperating.  
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Cooperating nodes have a better reputation, and have priority over 




Figure 15 - Illustration of the interaction for an m.Health application with the 
cooperation approach for 4 users. 
 
 
Hence the main objective of cooperation mechanisms is to assure 
that all users of a service-oriented mobile health application, regardless of 
their connectivity options (i.e., if they have or do not have Internet 
connectivity through WiFi or cellular network), can accomplish a request 
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4.2. Data Encryption for Mobile Health Applications 
(DE4MHA) 
 
This section presents the data encryption proposal for mobile health 
applications (DE4MHA) in cooperative environments. The main goal consists 
in assuring and guarantying m-Health data confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity in a cooperation environment, where sensitive and personal 
data is exchanged through several different agents. It is important to refer 
that this proposal focuses essentially on protecting data while being 
transmitted over the network, instead of considering the privacy and 
protection of data stored on mobile devices. 
Hence, data exchange among nodes must be accomplished through 
encryption techniques, to protect sensitive data from being disclosed to 
unauthorized entities. Two distinct possibilities are available for such 
objectives, namely symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. Chapter 2 
addressed this thematic approaching the pros and cons of each technique. 
Therefore DE4MHA uses a hybrid approach in which asymmetric algorithms 
are used for session key exchange and symmetric ones are used for 
encrypting data transferred among nodes on the network.  
The DE4MHA begins with a mobile node (a person using SapoFit), 
trying to access the SapoFit WS that contains the user profile, weight 
measures, fitness and diet indications. A SapoFit user (mobile requester 
node) without network connectivity and therefore without access to the 
SapoFit WS, will try through cooperation to obtain the required health 
information. For that, another user with network connectivity (mobile 
requested node) and with integrated cooperation mechanisms will forward 
the requested health information from the SapoFit WS. Both the requested 
and requester nodes will exchange (through Bluetooth) a public key 
message (PKM). After the public key exchange, the requested node creates 
a session key, encrypting it with the requester node’s public key. Then a 
signature of the whole message is created and appended to the session key 
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message (SKM) that is sent to the requester node. When the message is 
received, containing the session key, if its integrity and authenticity is 
verified, the requester node sends an acknowledgement (Ack) to the 
requested node. This method guaranties safe communication between 
nodes, otherwise if the integrity and authenticity is not verified, the 
communication between nodes is ended. A mobile node with network 
connectivity will access the cooperative WS to obtain the required health 
information. To secure all communication between the WS and the 
requested node, the secure socket layer (SSL) over the HTTP (also known as 
HTTPs) is used. Through SSL all retrieved health data from the WS is 
properly encrypted to assure maximum confidentiality of transmitted data. 
It is important to refer that DE4MHA focuses on a peer-to-peer node-
forwarding scheme based on node reputation, with encryption/decryption 
tasks on each node, limiting WS access to nodes with low reputation value. 
Each cooperative node encrypts and decrypts received messages until it 
reaches a node with Internet connectivity, what makes necessary that each 
mobile node possesses a session key agreed with the mobile node with 
which is communicating. Figure 16 illustrates the overall behaviour of 
DE4MHA and the most fundamental messages exchanged between two 
mobile nodes, that requires safe communication establishment in order to 
exchange information through cooperation. It essentially lies down to a 
requester node trying to obtain data through cooperation, performing the 
process of node discovery, and further connection through Bluetooth to a 
mobile node willing to cooperate (1). When both nodes are connected 
through Bluetooth, both nodes will generate a RSA key pair, exchanging 
their public key, so that each mobile node will be able to encrypt messages 
for later exchange (2). As soon as the requested node receives the 
requester node’s public key, it proceeds to generate an AES session key 
with 128 bits size, encrypting it through the requester node’s public key, 
appending then a digital signature to assure data integrity as well 
authenticity (3). Finally, if the previous message is received by the 
requester node, its integrity and its authenticity will be checked and if 




nothing wrong happened, the requester node will create an Ack message, 
and a signature to guaranty that requested nodes know that the requester 
node has properly received the session key (4). Therefore, all exchanged 
messages will be encrypted using the referred session key instead of the 
key pair used to exchange the session key, due to the superior time taken 
to encryption/decryption procedures by public key cryptography. 
   
 
Figure 16 - Data exchange sequence. 
 
4.2.1. Public Key Message 
 
Public key messages are sent from both requested nodes to 
requester nodes and aim to provide to each node their public key. This 
public key is used whenever it is required to encrypt a session key and send 
it afterwards, enabling safe session key transfer. If two mobile nodes in 
need to establish a safe connection already own opposites public keys, an 
exchange of a public key message is avoided, resulting in an improvement 
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Figure 17 illustrates the public key message. The two following 
modules comprise the public key message: 
 
§ Node unique ID: This identifier it is arranged through an 
aggregation of the mobile device Bluetooth mac address and 
the user unique identifier. 
 
§ Public Key: In this element will be placed the RSA public key 
previously generated along with the necessary private key. 
 
These two elements comprise the public key message, which 
essentially enables safe session key exchange among mobile nodes on the 
network. It is important to notice that all content inside of a public key 
message is carried through the network in plain text, due to the fact that 
public keys are intended to be public and made available to everyone. 
 
 
Figure 17 - Public Key Message. 
 
 
4.2.2. Session Key Message 
The requested node is the one who sends the session key message 
and it comprises three main components: (1) the requested ID, (2) the 
session key and (3) the signature. The three main components of the 
session key message are illustrated in Figure 18 and may be described as 
follows: 
Node ID Public Key
Public Key Message





§ Requested ID: As previously referred, the requested ID results 
from the aggregation of the mobile device Bluetooth mac 
address and the user unique identifier. 
 
§ Session Key: In this field will be placed the session key used to 
encrypt and decrypt all data flowing among mobile nodes on 
the network, assuring that all sensitive data is kept safe and 
its content remains unknown to unwanted threats, ensuring 
this way confidentiality. 
 
§ Signature: To every message exchanged between mobile 
nodes, an hash of that message is generated, being then 
encrypted with the node’s private key creating this way a 
signature of the message. It will enable the receiver node, in 
this particular case, the requester node, to assure that the 
message is exactly as it was when it was sent, i.e. its integrity 
remains intact, and at the same time it assures that the 
message was sent from the expected person (mobile node), 
i.e., guarantees authenticity. 
 
 
Figure 18 - Session Key Message. 
 
When the requester node receives the session key message from the 
requested node, it verifies its integrity and authenticity. If the message has 
Session Key Message
Node ID Session Key * Signature
* Encrypted
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not been corrupted, neither sent by someone else other than expected, 
both the requester and requested nodes can from this moment on safely 
communicate and exchange messages, using the session key that only both 
possess in common. 
 
4.2.3. Symmetric Algorithm Choice 
 
In order to choose the most suited symmetric encryption algorithm 
for DE4MHA, performance tests were conducted using four different 
encryption algorithms, namely AES, TripleDES, RC4 and Blowfish. The 
choice fell on these algorithms given the results registered and observed in 
the literature. Given that DE4MHA aims any mobile health application in a 
cooperative environment, therefore not knowing a priori the amount of 
data that each application usually handles, different sizes of data that 
should be encrypted have been used as a performance metric. 
As may be seen in Figure 19, results shown that when data size to 
encrypt grows, the encryption time (seconds) also increases, as expected. 
When comparing small amounts of data, all four algorithms presented 
similar results. However AES algorithm presented better results, since the 
encryption time of larger data tends to grow up very slowly. The other 
three tested algorithms all tend to grow up exponentially as data size to 
encrypt overcomes 1000KB. The 3DES algorithm presented the maximum 
observed encryption time, encrypting 10000KB of data, which took on 
average 14.3 seconds. With the same amount of data the AES encryption 
time was only 0.0045 seconds.  
Regarding decryption (Figure 20) similar results were obtained in 
comparison to encryption, i.e., all four tested algorithms presented nearly 
the same performance, achieving identical encryption/decryption times. 
Once again, AES algorithm took advantage over the other used algorithms, 
revealing the best performance in the conducted trials. AES algorithm 
presented a decryption time of average 0.0038 seconds to decrypt 10000KB 




of data, while in the worst-case scenario, 3DES algorithm presented the 
worst results observed. 
 
 
Figure 19 - Average Time Encryption. 
 
 






























































































Given the previous results obtained, AES algorithm was chosen to be 
the one operating on DE4MHA as a symmetric algorithm. 
 
4.2.4. Asymmetric Algorithm Choice 
 
Concerning the choice of an asymmetric algorithm in order to 
exchange session keys between mobile nodes, three options were taken in 
account, the RSA, Elgamal and the Diffie-Hellman algorithms. While RSA 
and ElGamal operate on the same base, i.e., through message encryption, 
Diffie-Hellman allows users to share a secret, generating then a session key 
based on the shared secret.  
Given that RSA algorithm has the possibility of using it not only for 
encryption, but also to perform digital signature, it was the chosen one in 
detriment of Elgamal and Diffie-Hellman, using it as a two-in-one 
algorithm. 
 
4.2.5. Integrity and Authenticity 
 
In order to assure integrity, message digest 5 (MD5) algorithm was 
chosen. It takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as 
output a 128-bit “hash” value or “message digest” of the input. When used 
multiple times with the exactly same message, it should always produce 
the same hash value. This way, if a message is modified or corrupted, by 
generating an hash value and comparing it with the original one, it is 
possible to verify if the message hasn’t been corrupted, i.e., if maintains 
its integrity. 
On the other hand, to guarantee authenticity, two approaches were 
taken in account, namely (1) using RSA algorithm to encrypt the hash value 
previously generated with MD5 and (2) using DSA, but unlike RSA it can only 
sign and can not encrypt information. Since a hybrid approach has been 




chosen, where AES is used for symmetric encryption and RSA used for 
asymmetric encryption, the last one was chosen to perform digital 
signature, taking in advantage the fact that RSA will be used both for 
session key exchange and digital signature performance. Thus, there’s no 
need for generating a pair of keys to exchange session keys, and another 
one for digital signature, avoiding reducing the efficiency of the proposal. 
DE4MHA is presented as a solution to assure confidentiality, integrity 
and authenticity of the data that is typically carried in m-Health 
applications with built-in cooperation mechanisms. It essentially focuses on 
forward health data between cooperative mobile nodes encrypting it from 
cooperative node to cooperative node, until reaching a web server (in a 
request scenario) or a mobile node (in a response scenario).  
 
4.3. Enhanced Cryptography Solution for m-Health 
Applications in Cooperative Environments (eC4MHA) 
 
This enhanced proposal called eC4MHA, focuses on enhancing the 
previous proposed solution for m-Heath applications in a cooperative 
environment. Thus, it overcomes the above-mentioned limitation that 
includes nodes forwarding messages, performing encryption/decryption 
tasks in each node. Furthermore, mobile nodes act merely as messages 
forwarders. They do not perform encryption tasks (except on the requester 
node and in the Web server), what contributes to increase the overall 
network performance in comparison to DE4MHA. 
 
4.3.1. Assuring Data Confidentiality 
 
To assure this property and as it happened in the previous proposal, 
two approaches were considered, 1) using only asymmetric cryptography, 
and 2) a hybrid approach using both asymmetric and symmetric 
cryptography. The first approach considered the utilization of RSA 
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algorithm with a 1024 bits key size on both mobile nodes and the WS itself. 
After public key exchange between the WS and a mobile node, all the 
exchanged information would be encrypted on the sender’s side with the 
receiver’s public key and decrypted with the receiver’s private key. 
Although this option is completely valid to specific scenarios, it is necessary 
taking into account that RSA algorithm can only encrypt a limited amount 
of data that is directly related to the public key size. For instance, a 1024 
public key can only encrypt 117 bytes, i.e., (1024/8) - 11 bytes.  
The eC4MHA proposal aims any m-Health system, including 
applications that handle different amounts of data. Hence, this approach 
was not feasible and was discarded. 
The second considered and applied approach in eC4MHA, is based on 
using a hybrid scheme to perform data confidentiality. The AES symmetric 
algorithm was chosen to encrypt all the data and the RSA asymmetric 
algorithm was used to exchange a random secret key used by the AES 
algorithm (previous performance evaluations regarding symmetric 
algorithms were taken into account, hence the choice of the AES 
algorithm). It is assumed that a user is able to access directly (through 
Internet connectivity) the m-Health application WS. The reason for such 
assumption is the required exchange of the secret key between the WS and 
the mobile node before encryption can be performed, as may be seen in 
Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21 - Illustration of key exchange sequence on eC4MHA. 
 
3. Send Symmetric Key Encrypted








From this moment on, the user is able to securely retrieve health 
data, whether cooperation is required or not. Thus, the applied strategy 
assumes a secure transaction of data between nodes and the WS using the 
AES encryption algorithm in Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB), with a key size of 
128 bits, and RSA algorithm with a 1024 bits keys size to exchange secret 
keys between nodes, and the WS. 
 
4.3.2. Integrity and Authenticity 
 
To assure authenticity, eC4MHA uses MD5 algorithm in order to 
produce a 128 bits output, called message digest. To guarantee integrity, it 
uses the RSA algorithm to encrypt the message digest, commonly known as 
digital signature. The digital signature is then appended to the message 
that should be sent over the network.  
Under this approach, cooperative mobile nodes should not know 
personal information that is being carried by messages sent all over the 
network, namely, the requester control message that contains user access 
credentials, such as username or password. A cooperative mobile node will 
merely act as a packet forwarder, until it reaches a mobile node with 
Internet connectivity. The mobile node is not aware of the packet content, 
other than required cooperative data, such as node identification, in order 
to forward back the response or reputation lists (RLs), determining and 
updating the level of cooperativeness of each mobile node. Through this 
proposal, it is assured that none of the sensitive information, such as login 
tokens or user’s health information, is disclosed to unauthorized persons. 
Furthermore, it guarantees that information received is the original one as 
well as it comes from an expected and reliable source. Otherwise, an alert 
message is displayed on the mobile device, informing the user that 








4.3.3. Key Management 
 
Cryptography algorithms require encryption/decryption keys to 
operate. Consequently, it is vital to assure key’s protection and privacy. 
This fundamentally depends on two factors, namely, where the keys are 
stored and who has access to them [101]. eC4MHA uses a keystore to store 
and assure key’s protection and privacy. As above-mentioned, it is 
necessary to establish a previous connection to the WS in order to exchange 
a secret key for later communications. After the secret key generation, a 
keystore is created and the key is then securely stored and protected with 
a user password in the mobile device. To retrieve the secret key, the user 
must provide a password (in a transparent manner). Although the secret 
key is physically present in the device, it is not possible to access it from 
another application other than the application used to store the key. As for 
the WS, a keystore is also generated and used to store its own private key 




Figure 22 - eC4MHA typical workflow. 
 
Figure 22 presents the overall and usual workflow of the eC4MHA in a 
cooperative environment. As may be seen, a requester node will try to 
4. Requeste sent to WS
6. Send Requester Control 
Message response
3. Send Requester Control Message
1. Discovery and connection
5. Encrypt response with Requester 
Node - WS agreed secret key
2. Send Node Control Message
7. Decrypt received 












discover and establish a connection to a mobile node through the above-
mentioned cooperation mechanisms, receiving then a node control 
message. Then, a requester control message is sent to the requested node 
in order to define what information is it requiring. All the sensitive data is 
encrypted and signed. The requested node will then forward the request to 
the WS. The WS will receive the data, encrypting and signing it. The 
response is sent back to the request node forwarding it to the requester 
node that, after decryption, message integrity, and authentication 




In this chapter it was shortly presented in Section 4.1 the 
cooperation mechanisms for which the cryptographic mechanisms were 
developed. In Section 4.2 and 4.3 were presented the architecture of the 
two considered and developed solutions, namely DE4MHA and eC4MHA 
respectively. Thus, the main objective of this chapter was to present two 
robust and reliable solutions that allows secure health data exchange in 
mobile health applications with cooperation mechanisms embedded. This is 
achieved through cryptography, by assuring three of the most fundamental 
properties concerning data security, i.e., data confidentiality (through 
encryption), data integrity (through hash functions) and authenticity 
(through digital signature). All these properties contribute to a more 












5. Performance Evaluation 
and System Validation 
 
This section focuses on the performance evaluation and validation of 
the cryptographic solutions developed for m-Health application with built-
in cooperation mechanisms. First, the m-Health application (SapoFit) and 
corresponding network scenario used to evaluate and demonstrate the 
solutions are introduced. Afterwards, the system validation and results are 
discussed for both approaches, concluding with a comparison between the 
two proposed solutions. 
 
5.1. SapoFit Application 
 
SapoFit is a weight control mobile health application that allows 
users to keep track of weight in a healthier and more practical way. 
SapoFit allows users to control their weight, body mass index (BMI), basal 
metabolic rate (BMR), sports activity, and the possibility to follow food 
plans based on their needed calories. In this m-Health application, all the 
users must be registered in a Web service. Figure 23 presents the three 
main activities screenshots of SapoFit application: Login, Plans, and User 
Profile. 
 








The proposed cryptographic solutions were integrated and deployed 
in this Android m-Health application with cooperation mechanisms 
embedded working ubiquitously, as previously referred, for test and 
evaluation purposes. The application with cooperation mechanisms on its 
essence uses a Web Service to remotely store and retrieve all user 
information, which was modified in this work to provide the cryptographic 
features to the WS.  
 
5.2. M-Health Network Scenario 
 
An illustration of the real network scenario used for the performance 
evaluation study of both DE4MHA and eC4MHA may be seen in Figure 24. It 
includes seven mobile nodes (using SapoFit), where three of them are 
assumed to be uncooperative nodes. Node M is the only node with available 
connection to the SapoFit Web service. Although this scenario may present 




mobility issues, for evaluation purposes, it is considered that each mobile 
node assumes the position presented in the network scenario. 
 
 
Figure 24 - Illustration of the network scenario for performance evaluation of the 
eC4MHA. 
 
In the presented scenario, all the devices have Bluetooth class 2 
modules, but only one device has Internet connectivity. Users without 
Internet connectivity must use the integrated cooperation mechanisms in 
order to obtain the requested health information. When the number of 
uncooperative nodes increases, the average time of any request or 
response also naturally increases. 
Non-cooperative cases where controlled and measured to a 
maximum of three to guarantee the minimum service performance. 
Through cooperation all the devices can indeed use the m-Health 
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The performance evaluation was carried using seven real mobile 
devices as may be seen in Figure 25, where three of them served as 
uncooperative nodes, with different hardware and software used with the 
SapoFit m-Health application. 
 
 
Figure 25 - Mobile devices used for trials with the SapoFit m-Health application. 
 
The seven mobile devices, three tablets and four smartphones have 
the Google Android Operating System, with the 4.0.4 version on the 
Samsung Nexus S, Asus Padphone 1, Samsung Nexus 7 as well on the 
Samsung Tab 10.1. Android version 2.3.3 is present on all left devices, i.e., 
on HTC Magic, Huawei A1 and Samsung Galaxy. As mentioned-above, these 
devices possess Bluetooth class 2 modules, as most of the common mobile 
devices [102], and the 2.1 core version. Bluetooth class 2 means that these 
devices have an approximate maximum range of ten meters. 
Next section presents the perform evaluation of both DE4MHA and 
eC4MHA individually, as well a comparison between both solutions. 
 
 





5.3.Performance Evaluation of DE4MHA and 
eC4MHA 
 
This section carries the perform evaluation of DE4MHA and eC4MHA 
individually, presenting the performance metrics which will then be used to 
evaluate the system performance in Section 5.3.1. Thus, performance 
metrics considered in this study are the service delivery probability (in 
percentage) and the service average delay (in seconds). The service delay 
is measured as the time between the request and its corresponding 
response, while the service delivery probability consists on the rate of 
successfully responses originated by mobile nodes requests. This section 
finishes with a comparison between DE4MHA and eC4MHA, using the 
previous performance metrics to assess which solution presented the best 
results. 
In order to efficiently evaluate the performance of both proposals, 
and to have an awareness of a comparison term, i.e., the means to 
evaluate how cryptographic mechanisms affect the performance of the 
cooperation mechanisms (although adding a robust layer of security), it was 
considered to use previous performance metrics tested in the application 
with cooperation mechanisms embedded and then use the same proposed 
metrics in the exact same application with cooperation mechanisms built-
in, but unlikely the former, with the proposed cryptographic solutions 
already incorporated, namely DE4MHA and eC4MHA proposals. 
 
5.3.1. DE4MHA Performance Analysis 
 
 The service delivery probability and the service average delay in 
function of the number of uncooperative mobile nodes in both scenarios 
(with and without cryptographic solutions) regarding DE4MHA are presented 
in Figure 26 and 27 respectively. 




Figure 26 - Service Delivery Probability with and without DE4MHA. 
 
 












































































Number of uncoopertive mobile nodes 
Without DE4MHA 
With DE4MHA 




As may be seen in Figure 26, the probability that a request is 
successfully answered in function of uncooperative nodes in the network 
decreases with the increasing of uncooperative mobile nodes. This is due to 
the fact that uncooperative nodes do not forward request or response 
messages. Taking into account, performed tests with and without DE4MHA, 
slightly worse results were observed with DE4MHA. The service average 
delay also grows as the number of uncooperative mobile nodes increases, 
as expected, observing also a slightly, but almost insignificant worse result 
when DE4MHA solution is present. Results show a minimal increase of the 
overall time taken to accomplish cooperation tasks when cryptographic 
mechanisms are present (e.g., encryption tasks or encryption keys 
exchanged between mobile nodes), not compromising the overall network 
performance. Hence, due to DE4MHA incorporation, the average time 
added with cryptographic tasks corresponds to approximately 0,003557 
seconds, and if compared with the average time taken by isolated use of 
cooperation mechanisms, it corresponds to an increase of 2% of the overall 
time. In this sense, the extra time required is perfectly acceptable since 
privacy and security is a concerning issue and nowadays a “must-have” in 
every m-Health application. This minimal increase of observed overall time 
to accomplish tasks when cryptographic solutions are present might be 
explained for two different reasons. The first one regards the evolution of 
mobile nodes in what processing capability respects, presenting nowadays a 
remarkable growth in this area. The second one, may be explained to the 
remarkable efficiency of the AES algorithm, which is used in this proposal 
to encrypt every communication between mobile nodes evolving any data 
transmission other than encryption keys, coupled with the fact that SapoFit 
usually handles a small amount of information. However and as illustrated 
on Chapter 4, AES algorithm presents real decent and satisfactory results 
when handling with both small and greater quantities of data to accomplish 
encryption tasks. 
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5.3.2. eC4MHA Performance Analysis 
 
To measure the perform evaluation of eC4MHA, the previous 
performance metrics were considered and the results may be observed at 
Figure 28 and 29, presenting the service delivery probability and the 
service average delay respectively. 
 
 
Figure 28 - Service Delivery Probability with and without eC4MHA. 
 
Figure 28 shows that cryptographic algorithms degrade slightly the 
overall performance, as expected and already observed with DE4MHA, due 
to more time consuming tasks, such as encryption and decryption. 
However, the service delivery probability presents similar results with 
cryptographic algorithms. The variance reflects the use of eC4MHA in cases 
where whether integrity or authenticity is not guaranteed, resulting in a 
denial of service to the initial request, besides the fact that uncooperative 
nodes also contribute to this registered variance. Therefore, it contributes 
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uncooperative nodes on the network, a rate of 89% of service delivery 
probability is registered while with eC4MHA a rate of 87.5% is achieved. In 
the worst-case scenario, eC4MHA presents a rate of 36.4% of delivery 
probability, as opposed to a rate of 38% without eC4MHA. 
 
 
Figure 29 - Service Average Delay with and without eC4MHA. 
 
The maximum service delay observed with three uncooperative 
nodes was about 59.8 seconds without eC4MHA and about 61.8 seconds with 
eC4MHA. These main variances were mostly caused by mobile devices 
constraints, such as loss of Bluetooth connection or distance variations 
among mobile nodes. 
 
5.3.3. DE4MHA and eC4MHA Comparison 
 
A performance evaluation analysis with the comparison of both 
cryptographic solutions for m-Health applications, DE4MHA and eC4MHA 
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service average delay with both approaches, it was demonstrated that 
eC4MHA is more efficient and it has better overall performance over 
DE4MHA. Significant changes were made to the previous proposed solution, 
considering that each cooperative node would have to encrypt and decrypt 
data, by make them acting uniquely as packet forwarders in this new 
approach. Results show a slight improvement in the performance of service 
average delay with the eC4MHA. In a worst case-scenario with three 
uncooperative nodes, the requester node would receive the response to the 
request in about 64.06 seconds with DE4MHA, while with eC4MHA an 




Figure 30 - Service Average Delay with DE4MHA and eC4MHA. 
 
When comparing service delivery probability, both approaches 
presented similar levels of delivery probability. With zero uncooperative 
mobile nodes, DE4MHA presents a delivery probability of 87,5% while 




































Number of uncooperative mobile nodes 
DE4MHA 
eC4MHA 




corrupted messages, resulting in a denial of service due to the 
compromising of messages integrity, explain why a rate of 100% is not 
achieved when there is no uncooperative mobile nodes on the network, as 
opposite to the cases where uncooperative nodes are present, which 
contributes in a much larger scale to the decrease of registered rates and 
why it decreases when uncooperative nodes increase. 
 
 
Figure 31 - Service Delivery Probability with DE4MHA and eC4MHA. 
 
 
5.4. Summary  
 
This chapter presented in Section 5.1 the m-Health application 
where the cryptographic mechanisms were integrated, namely the SapoFit 
application. This application, which was carried out by SAPO and NetGNA, 
aims the obesity prevention and treatment through a service oriented 
architecture. In Section 5.2, the network scenario was presented in order 
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presented the performance analysis of DE4MHA and eC4MHA based on two 
performance metrics, the service delivery probability (in percentage) and 
the service average delay (in seconds). Results clearly show that although a 
minimal increase of time is required in comparison to the original solution, 
where there are no cryptographic solutions, that fact becomes irrelevant 
due to the overall security added with the incorporation of such 
mechanisms. Last, a comparison between the two solutions was 
approached, which revealed that eC4MHA presents better results than 














This chapter presents a synthesis of this dissertation along with the 
main achievements that result from this work. It also points some 
directions for further work. The main objective of this dissertation was the 
study of cryptographic mechanisms application on m-Health applications 
with built in cooperation mechanisms. In short, these cryptographic 
mechanisms aimed to assure that user’s health data was kept safe and 
undisclosed to unauthorized entities mainly due to the sensitive data that 
these types of applications may carry (e.g. HIV disease information). After 
studying several cryptographic approaches, a requirement analysis in order 
to fetch all the systems analysis was conducted. Then, two different 
solutions were proposed, deployed, and evaluated over an application with 
cooperation mechanisms.  Thus, all the objectives were successful 
accomplished. 
After introducing and presenting the topic of this dissertation as well 
its objectives and main contributions, chapter two presented some related 
work on secure m-Health data exchange along with important related work 
in mobile health as well as some important insights in ubiquitous health and 
applications. 
Chapter three presented the requirement analysis taken before the 
cryptographic solutions development and integration process. First, 
essential requirements were defined followed by the usual UML diagrams 
necessary to model a system, ending with the used technologies. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
72 
Chapter four approached the developed cryptographic solutions for 
mobile health applications in a cooperative environment. Two different 
approaches were considered and were individually presented and explained 
in detail. A peer-to-peer messaging forward focusing on assuring protection 
and privacy of data while being transmitted from mobile node to mobile 
node or from mobile to/from the WS was considered for DE4MHA approach, 
where each node encrypts and decrypts messages among them until it 
reaches the WS. A second approach was considered and developed where 
each cooperative mobile node acts uniquely as a message forward node, 
with no content aware of the received and forwarded messages. When the 
message reaches the WS, it is finally decrypted and verified its authenticity 
and integrity, encrypting then the message response, being just decrypted 
when reaching the requester node. This last approach named eC4MHA, has 
the great advantage of not revealing message content to the cooperative 
nodes, i.e., besides focusing on the security of the data transmitted among 
nodes, it also considers the protection and privacy of data received by 
mobile nodes, presenting as well improved results. Both solutions were 
developed to assure three fundamental properties, namely data 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. 
Chapter five performs the system validation and performance 
evaluation. After a brief introduction about the used m-Health application 
(i.e., SapoFit) where the cryptographic mechanisms were integrated, the 
network scenario for test purposes was presented. Then, experiments were 
conducted in order to verify the behaviour and efficiency of the system 
considering a various number of uncooperative mobile nodes, in order to 
measure the performance of the both developed solutions individually, 
ending with a comparison between them, concluding that eC4MHA presents 
an improved performance when compared to DE4MHA. 
The cryptographic solutions in this work applied to m-Health 
applications under a cooperative environment, clearly presents advantages 
when comparing similar systems without security mechanisms, providing 
data privacy and protection, not compromising overall network 




performance. Health data is usually addressed as sensitive data, and may 
carry information about patients ill history, infectious disease or personal 
information, which is intended to be private, what requires addressing this 
thematic with the maximum care. Thus, it is necessary to take into account 
that due to the advent of mobile health applications, security measures are 
a fundamental part and should always be carefully addressed. 
 
6.2. Future Work 
 
To conclude this work, it just remains to suggest future research 
directions based on current work: 
 
§ The development of APIs for other mobile platforms, such as iOS 
from Apple and Windows Phone. 
§ A classification of sensitive health data addressing different security 
measures to different levels of sensitiveness. 
§ A performance assessment study through simulation considering 
different network scenarios and evaluate the scalability of the 
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Background: Mobile Health (m-Health) proposes healthcare delivering anytime and 
anywhere. It aims to answer several emerging problems in health services, including 
the increasing number of chronic diseases, high costs on national health services, and 
the need to provide direct access to health services, regardless of time and place. M-
Health systems include the use of mobile devices and applications that interact with 
patients and caretakers. However, mobile devices present several constraints, such 
as, processor, energy, and storage resource limitations. The constant mobility and 
often-required Internet connectivity also exposes and compromises the privacy and 
confidentiality of the Health information.  
Objective: This paper aims to present a proposal, construction, performance 
evaluation, and validation of a data encryption solution for mobile health 
applications, called DE4MHA, considering a novel and early-proposed cooperation 
strategy. The goal includes the presentation of a robust solution based on encryption 
algorithms that guarantee the best confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of users 
health information. In this study, we will present, explain, evaluate the performance, 
and discuss cooperation mechanisms and the proposed encryption solution for 
mobile Health applications.  
Methods: First, we design and deploy the DE4MHA. Then two studies where 
performed; 1) Study and comparison of symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption/decryption algorithms in an m-Health application under a cooperation 
environment; and 2) Performance evaluation of the DE4MHA. Its performance is 
evaluated through a prototype using an m-Health application for obesity prevention 
and cares, called SapoFit. We then conduct an evaluation study of the m-Health 
application with cooperation mechanisms and the DE4MHA using real users and a 
real cooperation scenario. Along five days, a different group of seven users agree to 
use and test the SapoFit application using the seven devices available for trials. 
Results: Thirty-five users, using SapoFit, participated in this study. The performance 
evaluation of the application was carried using seven real mobile devices in five 
different days. The results show that confidentiality and protection of the users health 
information is guarantied and SapoFit users were able to use with satisfactory quality 
the m-Health Application. Results also shown the application with the DE4MHA 





Conclusions: This study shows that DE4MHA offers a robust and reliable health 
information confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity for mobile health applications. 
Furthermore, it did not deteriorate the overall performance of the m-Health 
application maintaining slightly the same performance. Plus, this approach may be 
used in any health application. 
 
KEYWORDS: Mobile Health; m-Health; Mobile computing; e-Health; 
Cooperation; Encryption, Security 
Introduction 
 
In the last decade health telematics also known as Electronic Health (e-Health), have 
offered patients that live in remote rural areas, travel constantly, or are physically 
incapacitated for a given reason, more accessible and affordable healthcare solutions 
[1,2]. Health telematics are becoming a major improvement in the patient lives, 
especially those who are disabled, elderly, and chronically ill. Telemedicine assumes 
the use of medical information, also known as Electronic Health Records (EHRs), 
exchanged via electronic communications improving the patients’ health status [3]. 
This growing was analogue to the rapidly evolution of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) infrastructures and rapid access to patient data. 
The Web 2.0 concept and the emerging Web 3.0 come to offer opportunities to 
healthcare professionals never given before [4,5]. Now, physicians can perform 
several tasks through these modern technologies, such as the following: 
• Share medical videos (Youtube), photos (Flickr) and presentations 
(Slideshare)  
• Use blogs for posting medical cases and images 
• Share hospital management information 
• Use social networking to share medical ideas and tasks 
• Use RSS feeds to keep track of alerts on their specific interests 
 
With the advent of mobile communications using smart mobile devices that support 
3G and 4G mobile networks for data transport, mobile computing has been the main 
attraction of research and business communities. Thus, offering innumerous 
opportunities to create efficient mobile health solutions. Mobile health (m-Health) is 
the new edge on healthcare innovation. It proposes to deliver healthcare anywhere 
and anytime, surpassing geographical, temporal, and even organizational barriers 
[6,7].  Laxminarayan and Istepanian defined mobile health for the first time in 2000, 
as “unwired e-med” [8]. In 2003, the term ‘m-Health’ was defined as: ”emerging 
mobile communications and network technologies for healthcare systems” [9]. 
Laxminarayan et al., in 2006, present a comprehensive study on the impact of 
mobility on the existing e-Health commercial telemedical systems [10]. Furthermore, 
it served as basis for future m-health technologies and services [11]. Several research 
topics related to health have gathered important findings and contributions from m-
Health, such as, cardiology [12,13], diabetes [14-16], obesity [17-20], smoking 
cessation [21], among others. In the above-mentioned medical issues, m-Health 
applications are applied for health monitoring, diseases prevention and detection, 




also becoming popular in developing countries where healthcare facilities are 
frequently remote and inaccessible [2,22]. 
Architectures based on mobile devices and wireless communications present several 
challenging issues and constraints, such as battery and storage capacity, broadcast 
constraints, interferences, disconnections, noises, limited bandwidths, and network 
delays. In this sense, cooperation-based approaches are presented as a solution to 
solve such limitations, focusing on increasing network connectivity, communication 
rates, and reliability. 
In this paper we present a data encryption solution for mobile health applications 
(DE4MHA) in cooperative environments guaranteeing data confidentiality, integrity, 
and authenticity. This novel and early-proposed cooperation strategy [23] for m-
Health applications focuses on forwarding and retrieving data to/from nodes that 
have no direct connection to an m-Health service. In this sense, devices without 
Internet connectivity can use m-Health applications without problems. This 
cooperation approach presents a reputation-based strategy where a Web service 
manages the access control and the cooperation among nodes along with their 
reputation. It considers the following three main components: a node control 
message, a requester control message, and a cooperative Web service (CWS). Both 
control messages are used to manage a local cooperation between two or more nodes. 
The CWS includes a reputation table for all the nodes and decides which nodes can 
have access to the requested services. The cooperation strategy and the DE4MHA is 
deployed and evaluated in an m-Health application for obesity prevention and 
control, called SapoFit [24 - 26]. To the best of our knowledge, there are no 
cooperative solutions for m-Health services and applications considering this 
network scenario with constant network disconnection. DE4MHA uses symmetric 
and asymmetric encryption and decryption techniques. We use the RSA [27] 
algorithm for asymmetric encryption/decryption to ensure Key exchange 
confidentiality and the Advanced Encryption Standart (AES) [28] algorithm for 
symmetric encryption/decryption for data confidentiality. To ensure data integrity we 
have created message digest that creates a hash of transmitted data and for data 
authenticity we use a digital signature. We encrypt the hash message with the RSA 
private Key. To secure the communication with the SapoFit Web Service (WS), we 
use the HTTPs protocol.  
In this paper we report two studies that were performed to design and construct the 
DE4MHA algorithms: (1) a direct evaluation and comparison of several encryption 
algorithms and (2) a series of trials evolving 35 persons and seven different mobile 
devices with SapoFit. The first study revealed what algorithms present the best 
performance in an m-Health application in cooperation environments. This study 
evaluates the performance of the DE4MHA over the cooperation mechanisms for m-





This study used an available m-Health application, called SapoFit to deploy, 
evaluate, and validate the proposed solution. This application uses a cooperation 
strategy that addresses two related limitations to m-Health applications with service-




dependency. It follows a reputation-based approach as an incentive method for 
cooperation, which includes a Web service to manage all the network cooperation. It 
is responsible for verifying the cooperation status of neighbor nodes and to provide 
relay nodes the required data in order to perform a full data request. 
 
Cooperation Strategy for m-Health applications 
 
The cooperation strategy for m-Health applications with service oriented 
architectures (SOAs) is based on the following two mobile modules and one remote 
module: i) the node control message, ii) the requester control message, and iii) the 
cooperative Web service (CWS). 
The mobile nodes control messages aim to provide an awareness of the relay node 
status, i.e., if the node is willing to cooperate and in what conditions. It contains the 
established node unique identifier, the battery state, the Internet connectivity status, 
and the cooperation status (i.e., if it is cooperative or not). 
The requester control message is sent by the initial requester node first (the mobile 
device with m-health application requesting health data), and it comprises the 
following five main components: 1) the requester ID, the node unique identifier; 2) 
the service request, i.e., what the node is specifically requesting (e.g., the login token 
or its health profile); 3) the neighbors list; 4) the reputation list; and 5) the achieved 
cooperation time (ACT). 
The cooperative Web service (CWS) is responsible for performing a fair access 
control to data. Thus, according to the received reputation information, the Web 
service holds the final reputation list in order to decide if a requester node should 
have access to the m-Health application Web service or not. The reputation list 
contains all registered network nodes with their identifier and their corresponding 
reputation value.  
Figure 1 presents a user scenario of the m-Health cooperation approach. User A has 
network connectivity and cooperates, the status value is according to the battery 
status. User B has network connectivity and does not cooperate. Then, the status 
value will suffer a negative impact according to the battery status. Users C and D do 
not have network connectivity. User C queries User A for cooperation and receives a 
positive response and all the requested data. User D queries User B for cooperation 
and receives a negative response. Then, User D requests data from User C that 
answers this request, getting positive status by cooperating.  
Cooperating nodes have a better reputation, and have priority over selfish nodes to 






Fig 1. Illustration of the interaction for an m-Health application with  
the proposed cooperation approach for 4 users. 
 
SapoFit Application 
SapoFit is a weight control mobile application that allows users to keep track of 
weight in a healthier and more practical way. SapoFit allows users to control their 
weight, body mass index (BMI), basal metabolic rate (BMR), sports activity, and the 
possibility to follow food plans based on their needed calories. In this m-Health 
application all the users must be registered in a Web service. Figure 2 presents the 
following three main activities screenshots of SapoFit application: Login, 
Plans, and User Profile. 
 






Data Encryption Algorithm for Mobile Health applications (DE4MHA) 
The process begins with a mobile node (a person using SapoFit) trying to access the 
SapoFit Web Service that contains the user profile, weight measures, fitness, and diet 
indications.  
A SapoFit user (mobile requester node) without network connectivity and therefore 
without access to the SapoFit Web services (WS) obtains the required health 
information through cooperation. Another SapoFit user with network connectivity 
(mobile requested node) will forward the requested health information from the 
SapoFit Web service. Both the requested and requester nodes will create a pair of 
RSA keys and send to both requester and requester node their public keys (through 
Bluetooth). After the public key exchange, the requested node creates an AES 
session key.  
The next step is the creation of the digest message and its encryption using the 
private key. The MD5 algorithm was used to create a 128 bits hash. For data 
authenticity we use digital signature. A digital signature is created for the message 
containing requested health information. This digital signature allows any node to 
verify that message is the original one.  By decrypting the digital signature with the 
public key, the original digest message is obtained. The receiver node then creates a 
new hash of the received message and compares it to the decrypted digest message to 
guarantee authenticity. The digital signature is then added to the message. When the 
message containing the session key is received, if its integrity and authenticity is 
verified, the requester node then sends an acknowledgement (ack) to the requested 
node. This method guaranties safe communication between nodes, otherwise if the 
integrity and authenticity is not verified the communication between nodes is ended.  
A mobile node with network connectivity will access the cooperative WS to obtain 
the required health information. To secure all communication with the WS the 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) over the HTTP (also known as HTTPs) is used. 
Therefore, it grants confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of all retrieved health 
data from the Web service.      
Two studies were performed. 1) a study evaluating what symmetric and asymmetric 
algorithm presents the best performance in an m-Health application in cooperation 
environment, and 2) a series of trials evolving 35 persons and seven different mobile 
devices with SapoFit. This study evaluates the performance of the DE4MHA over 
the cooperation mechanisms. 
 
 
Study 1: Study and comparison of symmetric and asymmetric 




Symmetric Algorithm  
In order to choose the best suited symmetric encryption algorithm for SapoFit 
application (DE4MHA), performance experiments were conducted using four 








Concerning the choice of an asymmetric algorithm in order to exchange session keys 
between mobile nodes, two options were considered. We tested RSA, which enables 
encrypting the session key, subsequently being sent, and Diffie-Hellman [32] which 
allows users to share a secret, generating then a session key based on the shared 
secret. For our network scenario these are the most suited algorithms. Other 




Study 2: Performance evaluation of the DE4MHA  
 
The performance evaluation study was carried using seven real mobile devices, 
which have been used seven times in five different days with a total of 35 different 
users who tested successfully the application. Figure 3 presents the seven different 
mobile devices with different hardware and software used with the SapoFit m-Health 
application.  
Cooperative nodes, without network connection, cooperate with each other through 
Bluetooth. The communication with the CWS can be obtained through the device   
Wi-Fi or Edge/3.5G/4G modules. The CWS was developed with the help of Java 
Server Pages (JSP) technology, using the REST architecture. To serve the Web 
Service the Apache Tomcat Web Server is used.  
Non-cooperative cases where controlled and measured to a maximum of 4 to 
guarantee the minimum service performance. Through cooperation all the devices 
can indeed use the m-Health application. However, uncooperative nodes affect 
directly the service delivery probability, service average delay, and the overall 
network performance. Performance metrics considered in this study are the service 
delivery probability (in percentage) and the service average delay (in seconds). We 
present a comparison of the performance of the m-Health application with and 









User Trials Evaluation of DE4MHA in Cooperative Environments 
 
User trials were conducted within the University informatics department using seven 
devices available for trials. Along five days, a different group of seven students agree 
to use and test the SapoFit application. Users were in constant movement moving far 
away from each other. This mobility is necessary to test the network scenario forcing 
network delays and disconnections. The cooperative strategy and the DE4MHA is 
ubiquitous to its user and through out the trials users only experience and use the 
obesity prevention services that SapoFit offers without any constraints or perception 
of any cooperation mechanism or encryption algorithm that is embedded in the m-
Health application. 
While conducting the experiments, almost every users asked if their information was 
being kept secure or not, clearly showing that they did not wanted their health 
information to be available or disclosed to unauthorized people, revealing privacy 
concerns. Another frequent raised question concerns the need to share Internet 
connectivity to other users.  
We explain and justify that sharing and cooperating with other users is essential to 
obtain a better reputation. Furthermore we demonstrate to them that SapoFit is no 
intrusive with other user personal data on the mobile device and only requests 
SapoFit services.  
After the experiments, the users completed a survey evaluating their experience. The 
questions are listed in Table I and the results may be seen in Figure 4. As can be 
observed, the results are very good the received feedback is very promised for this 
solution. 
 
Table I. Survey Questions. 
Question Description 
Q1 Without network connectivity, the user always gets the required 
information? 
Q2 Without network connectivity, the required information was 
delivered in a confortable time? 
Q3 Understanding the implemented cooperation strategy and its benefits, are you willing to cooperate and share the 
device/network resources with other users? 
Q4 With the encryption strategy applied to SapoFit, do you trust 
that your personal health information is secure? 
Q5 Was the mobile device affected by the application cooperation 







Fig. 4. Results of the survey evaluating the main questions about the performance of 








As may be seen in Figure 5, results shown that when data size to encrypt grows, the 
encryption time (seconds) also increases, as expected. When comparing small 
amounts of data, all the four algorithms present similar results. However, AES 
algorithm presents better results since the encryption time of bigger data tends to 
grow up very slowly. The other three experimented algorithms all tend to grow up 
exponentially as data size to encrypt overcomes 1000KB. The 3DES algorithm 
presented the maximum observed encryption time, encrypting 10000KB of data, 
which took on average 14.3 seconds. With the same amount of data the AES 
encryption time was only 0.0045 seconds. Regarding decryption we obtained nearly 
the same results. AES algorithm decryption time is in average 0.0038 seconds to 




Fig. 5. Comparison of Encryption and Decryption of Symmetric algorithms  









































































DE4MHA aims mobile health applications in a cooperative environment. Therefore, 
the amount and size of data exchange in these network scenarios is unknown and 
unpredictable. Through the obtained results (Figure 5) we concluded that the AES 
algorithm with a 128 bits key encryption is the most efficient algorithm for these 





Regarding the choice of an asymmetric algorithm in order to exchange session keys 
between mobile nodes, two options were considered, the RSA and the Diffie-
Hellman algorithms. The RSA encrypts the session key, subsequently being sent, and 
Diffie-Hellman allows users to share a secret, generating then a session key based on 
the shared secret.  
Several experiments were performed with both algorithms with RSA presenting 
better encryption times than Diffie-Hellman, due to the high amount of computation 
needed by Diffie-Hellman and the low processing capacity of mobile devices. 
 
 
DE4MHA Performance evaluation results 
 
In the presented scenario, all the devices have Bluetooth class 2 modules, but only 
three devices have Internet connectivity. Users without Internet connectivity must 
use the integrated cooperation mechanisms in order to obtain the requested health 
information. When the number of uncooperative nodes increases, the service delivery 
probability decreases. The service average delay also presents the same behavior, as 
expected. Increasing the number of uncooperative nodes the service average delay 
increases.  
Figure 6 shows results of the service delivery probability and the service average 
delay in function of the number of uncooperative mobile nodes with and without the 
DE4MHA. As may be seen, the probability that a request is successfully answered in 
function of uncooperative nodes in the network decreases with the increasing of 
uncooperative mobile nodes. Taking into account both approaches, with and without 
DE4MHA, it is observed that DE4MHA presents a slightly worse result. The service 
average delay also grows when the number of uncooperative mobile nodes increases, 




Fig. 6. Service delivery probability and service average delay in function of the 






































































Our main goal was focused on the proposal and construction of a security 
encryption/decryption based solution in a cooperative environment for m-health 
applications. We aimed to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. 
Privacy is a top priority issue in m-Health services and applications that deal with 
user sensitive information. On m-Health applications several security issues must be 
considered, such as personal information management, secondary use of personal 
information, improper use of personal information, and errors with stored personal 
information. Therefore, cryptographic mechanisms can be seen as a solution to 
guarantied data confidentiality and protection [34]. 
In a mobility and cooperative environment with constant health data forward and 
retrieval, studying and developing security mechanisms become crucial. Several 
experiments were conducted, involving 35 different users, in order to check if they 
could distinguish the application running with and without the DE4MHA embedded. 
Through the trials we concluded that users could not tell which application had the 
DE4MHA embedded mainly because the time response taken to obtain the user 
health information being nearly the same as the one without DE4MHA. The 
DE4MHA is implemented in a ubiquitous manner so users would be able to keep 
using the application without noticing changes or any privacy mechanisms. 
All along we had to lead with several limitations. The main limitation concerned 
applying security on mobile devices due to the low processor capacity when 
compared with traditional PCs, though nowadays we are seeing a tremendous 
improvement on this matter, with a few devices being capable to compete with the 
traditional PCs. Due to this, we experimented several security algorithms concerning 
confidentiality (AES, RC4, 3DES and Blowfish), integrity (MD5 and SHA1), and 
authenticity (RSA with MD5 and DSA with SHA1) in order to verify which one had 
a better performance in a mobile environment. 
During the experiments some users without Internet connectivity who wanted to 
obtain health information, were in constant movement moving far away from other 
users with cooperation mechanism embedded, resulting in a failure obtaining the 
desired health information due to not being in a range of 10 meters that Bluetooth 
class 2 modules require. Another limitation, though not related to security, regards 
the number of uncooperative nodes (mobile nodes that may not want to cooperate or 
they may not have cooperation mechanisms embedded), compromising service 




This paper proposed a data encryption solution for mobile health applications, called 
DE4MHA. The data encryption algorithm DE4MHA with cooperation mechanisms 
in mobile health allow users to safely obtain health information with the data being 
carried securely. These security mechanisms did not deteriorate the overall network 
performance and the application, maintaining slightly the same performance. 
However, it offers a robust and reliable increase of privacy, confidentiality, integrity, 




specific m-Health application, called SapoFit, both DE4MHA and the cooperation 
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Abstract— Mobile health (m-Health) applications delivers 
healthcare services through mobile applications regardless of 
time and place. An m-Health application makes use of wireless 
communications to sustain its health services and often providing 
a patient-doctor interaction. Therefore, m-Health applications 
present several challenging issues and constraints, such as, 
mobile devices battery and storage capacity, broadcast 
constraints, interferences, disconnections, noises, limited 
bandwidths, network delays, and of most importance, privacy 
and confidentiality concerns. This paper proposes a novel and 
enhanced cryptography solution in a cooperative environment 
considering a novel and early-proposed cooperation strategy for 
m-Health Applications. This proposal aims to face the challenges 
related to privacy and security issues of all forwarded and 
retrieved data concerning user sensitive information. 
Furthermore, it presents a performance evaluation of this 
proposal considering a comparison with an earlier proposed 
encryption strategy for the same cooperative environment.  
Keywords— Mobile Health; m-Health; Mobile computing;  
e-Health; Cooperation; Cryptography 
 INTRODUCTION  
M-Health is considered the future of health telematics and 
a central point on healthcare innovation. It can be defined as 
the integration and application of health services in mobile 
technologies intended to deliver healthcare anywhere and 
anytime. Therefore, offering more ease of access to healthcare 
solutions overcoming issues like geographical, temporal, and 
even organizational barriers [1-2]. Hence, m-Health is 
commonly used in telemedicine allowing e.g., personal health 
care remote management and patient’s health status 
monitoring [3]. Mobile devices and wireless communications 
support typical m-Health applications. However, these 
applications present several challenging issues and constraints, 
such as, battery and storage capacity, broadcast constraints, 
interferences, disconnections, noises, limited bandwidths, and 
network delays. Cooperation-based approaches are presented 
as a solution to solve such limitations and to improve wireless 
networks performance [4]. In the absence of a stable network 
infrastructure, mobile nodes cooperate with each other 
performing all networking functionalities [5]. 
A novel and early proposal of a reputation-based 
cooperation strategy for m-Health services, was presented in 
[6]. The main goal of this proposal allows and delivers access 
to health data despite connectivity state and availability. 
However, cooperation among mobile devices involves 
sensitive and private health data exchange, like personal health 
records or health treatment plans that are desirable to be kept 
private and undisclosed to unauthorized people. Health data 
privacy, integrity and authentication are major concerns when 
using m-Health applications. Cryptography algorithms are 
presented has a solution to the above mentioned security 
concerns. Due to the advent and evolution of current mobile 
devices, cryptographic algorithms are now capable of securing 
and exchanging data without the concern of mobile resources 
that could decrease cooperative gains and compromising the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the network or even 
degrading the mobile application user experience. 
This paper presents a novel and enhanced cryptography 
strategy for m-Health applications in a cooperative 
environment called Enhanced Cryptography for Mobile Health 
Applications (eC4MHA). It focuses on assuring and 
guarantying the m-Health application data confidentiality, 
integrity, and authenticity. The performance assessment and 
evaluation of the proposal considers a comparison to a 
previous and early-proposed proposed encryption strategy for 
m-Health applications, called DE4MHA [7]. This evaluation 
studies the impact of the cryptography strategy on the 
performance of an m-Health application under the cooperative 
solution and environment. The evaluation was conducted 
using an m-Health application, named SapoFit, that aims 




The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II elaborates on related work regarding health data privacy and 
security in a mobile environment that contributes to the 
proposed cryptography solution. Section III describes the 
proposed m-Health cryptography strategy in a cooperative 
environment while a performance evaluation and validation 
through a real m-Health application is presented in Section IV. 
Section V concludes the paper and points out further research 
points. 
RELATED WORK 
Security is expected to be a central point in the evolution of 
pervasive m-Health applications towards mobile wireless 
networks. Energy saving in a mobile environment is a major 
concern that must be addressed carefully due to mobile 
devices limited resources. Often, typical m-Health network 
architectures require connectivity availability to operate with 
Web Services (WSs). This interaction is responsible for major 
energy consuming. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth transmissions are 
responsible for a significant consumption of battery power, 
specially Wi-Fi that can achieve up to 50% of the total energy 
unlikely Bluetooth which is believed to consume less than 
10% battery power [11]. Furthermore, the mobile devices 
processing capability must be considered while developing 
mobile applications.  
Cryptography algorithms are solutions to guarantee data 
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity [12]. The use of 
these algorithms in mobile and wireless communications, 
represent time consuming and costly tasks to be executed. 
Therefore, a lightweight rather than complex approach is 
desired in such context. Securing e-Health data in a mobile 
environment has been a matter with high importance, mainly 
due to the data sensitivity associated exchanged between users 
[13]. In [14], it is proposed an architecture that allows 
exchanging patient’s medical record in a secure way through 
existing infrastructure of mobile operators. Generic 
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) is used to enable user 
authentication while the other entity in the communication 
(service provider, hospital, and network operator) 
authenticates through usage of Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI). To guarantee a secure communication, encryption and 
digital signature techniques are used. In [15], authors describe 
a new trend in security of e-health data presenting XML 
security solutions describing some selected solutions in health 
data. eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
and Security Assertion Markup Language  (SAML) are 
presented enabling authentication and authorization in a large 
network space. Moreover, SAML enables transmission of 
authentication data between parties, namely between an 
identity provider and a service provider. XACML defines 
access control policies and a processing model describing how 
to evaluate authorization requests according to the rules 
defined in the policies. 
The above-mentioned approaches present features required 
in an m-health scenario. However, some limitations arise, 
specifically the first one is the mobile operator dependency 
and the second one is focused towards systems exchanging 
data in XML format. Furthermore, cooperative scenarios 
present its own specific features and limitations, such as node 
misbehaviour or loss of connections requiring special care. 
Hence, an early-proposed encryption strategy for such 
cooperative scenarios was proposed in [7], called DE4MHA. 
This proposal addresses data privacy and protection achieved 
through a hybrid approach using both symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptography, not being confined to a specific 
mobile operator or a specific data file format. DE4MHA 
allows data exchange among nodes assuring data 
confidentiality through a symmetric algorithm, namely 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). An integrity and 
authenticity mechanism is achieved through usage of a 
combination of the Message Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm and 
the asymmetric algorithm Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA). 
Afterwards, an output called message digest is calculated from 
the original message to be sent and then encrypted with RSA’s 
private key. The result of the last operation (digital signature) 
is appended to the message, providing to the receiver the 
possibility of confirming if the received data is the original 
one and that it was sent from the expected source. This 
approach considers a peer-to-peer node-forwarding scheme 
based on node reputation, with message content aware, 
limiting WS access to nodes with low reputation value. 
The cryptography strategy proposed in this paper 
overcomes the above-mentioned limitation that includes nodes 
forwarding messages with no content-aware other than strictly 
required information. Furthermore, mobile nodes act merely as 
messages forwarders. They do not perform encryption tasks, 
increasing the overall network performance in comparison to 
DE4MHA (demonstrated in section IV).   
CRYPTOGRAPHY SOLUTION FOR M-HEALTH APPLICATIONS 
IN COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
This section presents the reputation-based cooperation 
strategy for m-Health applications and the cooperative 
environment. Furthermore, it describes in detail, the novel 
cryptography solution for cooperative m-Health applications 
(eC4MHA). 
A. Cooperation mechanisms 
This reputation-based cooperation strategy relies on a WS 
to manage a fair access control to data and cooperation among 
nodes based on their reputation. According to the received 
reputation information, the WS decides if a requester node 
should have access to the requested data or not. Cooperating 
nodes with better reputation have priority over selfish nodes to 
access the m-Health application services. 
This cooperation strategy for m-Health applications with 
service oriented architectures (SOAs) is based on two mobile 
and a remote module: i) the node control message, ii) the 
requester control message, and iii) the cooperative Web 
service (CWS).  
The node control messages provide an awareness of the 
node status, i.e., if the node is willing to cooperate and in what 
conditions. It includes the node unique identifier, battery state, 




status. The requester control message is first sent from the 
requester node (a mobile node without Internet connection and 
therefore without access to the m-Health application services) 
and it contains five main components: 1) the requester ID, the 
node unique identifier; 2) the service request, i.e., what the 
node is specifically requesting (e.g., the login token or its 
health profile); 3) the neighbors list; 4) the reputation list; and 
5) the achieved cooperation time (ACT). 
The cooperative Web service (CWS) is responsible for 
performing a fair access control to data, deciding if a node 
should be able to get the requested data or not. Thus, 
according to the received reputation information, the CWS 
holds the final reputation list in order to decide if a requester 
node should have access to the m-Health application Web 
service or not. The reputation list contains all the registered 
network nodes with their identifier and their respective 
reputation value. 
B. Enhanced Cryptography Solution for M-Health 
Applications: eC4MHA 
eC4MHA focuses on three major concerns on mobile and 
wireless communications, namely data confidentiality, 
integrity, and authenticity. Confidentiality assures that data is 
not made available or disclosed to unauthorized persons. 
However, guarantying data confidentiality may not be enough 
to ensure overall security and privacy of personal health 
information. Data integrity and authenticity assures that data 
has not been modified and its source is reliable.  
Assuring Data Confidentiality 
Two approaches were considered, 1) using only asymmetric 
cryptography, and 2) a hybrid approach using both asymmetric 
and symmetric cryptography. The first approach considered the 
usage of RSA algorithm with a 1024 bits key size on both 
mobile nodes and the WS itself. After public key exchange 
between the WS and a mobile node, all the exchanged 
information would be encrypted on the sender’s side with the 
receiver’s public key and decrypted with the receiver’s private 
key. Although this option is completely valid to specific 
scenarios, it is necessary taking into account that RSA 
algorithm can only encrypt a limited amount of data that is 
directly related to the public key size. For instance, a 1024 
public key can only encrypt 117 bytes, i.e., (1024/8) - 11 
bytes.  
eC4MHA aims any m-Health system, including 
applications that deal with different amounts of data. 
Therefore, this approach was not feasible and was discarded. 
The second approach considered and applied in eC4MHA, 
is based on using a hybrid scheme to perform data 
confidentiality. The AES symmetric algorithm was chosen to 
encrypt all the data and the RSA asymmetric algorithm was 
used to exchange a random secret key used by the AES. It is 
assumed that an user is able to access directly (through Internet 
connectivity) the m-Health application WS. The reason for 
such assumption is the required exchange of the secret key 
between the WS and the mobile node before encryption can be 
performed, as may be seen in Figure 1. Therefore, the user is 
now able to securely retrieve health data, whether cooperation 
is required or not. Thus, the applied strategy assumes a secure 
transaction of data between nodes and the WS using the AES 
encryption algorithm in Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB), with a 
key size of 128 bits, and RSA algorithm with a 1024 bits keys 
size to exchange secret keys between nodes, and the WS. 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of the Key exchange sequence on 
eC4MHA. 
Integrity and authenticity 
To assure authenticity, eC4MHA uses Message Digest 5 
(MD5) algorithm in order to produce a 128 bits output, called 
message digest. To guarantee integrity, it uses the RSA 
algorithm to encrypt the message digest, commonly known as 
digital signature. The digital signature is then appended to the 
message that should be sent over the network.  
Under this approach, cooperative mobile nodes should 
know their personal information that is being carried by 
messages sent all over the network, namely, the requester 
control message that contains user access credentials, such as 
username or password. A cooperative mobile node will merely 
act as a packet forwarder, until it reaches a mobile node with 
Internet connectivity. The mobile node is not aware of the 
packet content, other than required cooperative data such as 
node identification in order to forward back the response or 
reputation lists (RLs) determining and updating the level of 
cooperativeness of each mobile node. Through this proposal, it 
is assured that none of the sensitive information, such as login 
tokens or user’s health information, is disclosed to 
unauthorized persons. Furthermore, it guarantees that 
information received is the original one as well as it comes 
from an expected and reliable source. 
Key Management 
Cryptography algorithms require encryption/decryption 
keys to operate. Therefore, it is vital to assure key’s protection 
and privacy. This fundamentally depends on two factors, 
namely, where the keys are stored and who has access to them 
[16]. eC4MHA uses a keystore to store and assure key’s 
protection and privacy. As above-mentioned, it is necessary to 
establish a previous connection to the WS in order to exchange 
a secret key for later communications. After a secret key 
generation, a keystore is created and the key is then securely 
stored and protected with a user password in the mobile device. 
To retrieve the secret key, the user must provide a password (in 
a transparent manner). Although the secret key is physically 
present in the device, it is not possible to access it from another 
application other than the application used to store the key. As 
for the WS, a keystore is also generated and used to store its 
3. Send Symmetric Key Encrypted







own private key and each secret key needed for each node that 
requests data. 
Figure 2 presents the overall and usual workflow of the 
eC4MHA in a cooperative environment. As may be seen, a 
requester node will try to discover and establish a connection to 
a mobile node through the above-mentioned cooperation 
mechanisms, receiving then a node control message. Then, a 
requester control message is sent to the requested node in order 
to define what information is it requiring. All the sensitive data 
is encrypted and signed. The requested node will then forward 
the request to the WS. The WS will receive the data, 
encrypting and signing it. The response is sent back to the 
request node forwarding it to the requester node that, after 
decryption, message integrity, and authentication verification 
will obtain the requested data. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Illustration of the eC4MHA overall workflow. 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This section focuses on the performance evaluation and 
validation of the m-Health cryptography proposal. An  
m-Health application, called SapoFit, was used to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed cryptography approach. The 
network scenario and expected node behaviors are also 
presented. Then, the validation and feasibility of the proposal is 
evaluated through a comparison with an early-proposed 
cryptography strategy, called DE4MHA, above described in 
Section II. 
a. SapoFit Application 
SapoFit is a weight control mobile application that allows 
users to keep track of weight [8-10]. It allows users to control 
their weight, body mass index (BMI), basal metabolic rate 
(BMR), sports activity, and the possibility to follow food plans 
based on their needed calories. In this m-Health application all 
the users must be registered in a Web service. For performance 
evaluation of eC4MHA, it is considered a user without Internet 
connection requesting access to the Login and Food Plans 
services. Therefore, the user Profile will be fully obtained 
through cooperation among nodes. 
b. M-Health network scenario 
An illustration of the real network scenario used for the 
performance evaluation study of the eC4MHA may be seen in 
Figure 3. It includes seven mobile nodes (using SapoFit), 
where three of them are assumed to be uncooperative nodes. 
Node M is the only node with available connection to the 
SapoFit Web services. Although this scenario may present 
mobility issues, for evaluation purposes, it is considered that 
each mobile node assumes the position presented in the 
network scenario. 
 
Figure 3 - Illustration of the network scenario for performance 
evaluation of the eC4MHA. 
The activity diagram of a mobile node is presented in Figure 4 
It is subdivided into two logical parts: 1) Node discovery and 
connection and 2) Cooperative Web Service. The main goal 
consists in establishing a connection with the WS to obtain the 
required data. First, a node with no Internet connectivity and, 
therefore, unable to retrieve required data by itself, starts 
searching for neighbor nodes. If a node is found, cooperation 
information is exchanged among them, determining the 
cooperation status of the requested node as well what 
information it wants to retrieve. If the requested node is willing 
to cooperate, a requester control message is sent to the 
requested node. Sensitive information, e.g., passwords or 
health data, is encrypted with a secret key, shared uniquely 
between the requester node and the WS, and then signed with 
requester node’s private key. This way, the cooperative node 
will not be able to access unauthorized information, but only 
strictly required information necessary to forward the request 
to the WS. As soon as the request arrives at the WS, it verifies 
the authenticity and integrity of the request. If both are verified, 
the required data is obtained by the WS and then encrypted 
with the previous referred key. Furthermore, the content of the 
message is also signed by the server in order for the requester 
node to check its integrity and authenticity. Later the message 
is sent to the requested node, with only the required 
information to decrypt.  
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Figure 4 - Activity diagram of a mobile node representing a 
mobile device with SapoFit and a typical node behavior. 
c. Performance Analysis 
This section focuses on the performance analysis eC4MHA 
through a comparison with an early-proposed cryptography 
strategy, called DE4MHA, above described in Section II. 
The study was performed through a real m-Health application, 
called SapoFit. The case study scenario included seven devices 
running the SapoFit application. Non-cooperative cases were 
controlled and measured to worst case-scenario of three 
uncooperative nodes, to guarantee the minimum service 
performance. However, uncooperative nodes affect directly the 
service delivery probability, the service average delay, and the 
overall network performance. Hence, the first analysis refers to 
the performance comparison of the m-Health application with 
and without the used cryptography mechanisms. To obtain a 
comparison of both cases, performance metrics were 
considered, namely the service delivery probability and the 
service average delay (in seconds). The service delay is 
measured as the time between the request and its corresponding 
response. The service delivery probability and the service 
average delay in function of the number of uncooperative 
mobile nodes in both scenarios (with and without cryptography 
algorithms) are presented in Figures 5 and 6. As may be seen, 
cryptography algorithms degrade slightly the overall 
performance, as expected, due to more time consuming tasks, 
such as encryption and decryption. Furthermore, the service 
delivery probability presents similar results with cryptography 
algorithms. The variance reflects the use of eC4MHA in cases 
where whether integrity or authenticity is not guaranteed, 
resulting in a denial of service to the initial request, therefore, 
contributing to the decrease of the service delivery probability. 
 
Figure 5 - Service delivery probability as function of the 
number of uncooperative nodes with and without eC4MHA. 
 
Figure 6 - Service average delay as function of the number of 
uncooperative nodes with and without eC4MHA. 
The maximum service delay observed with three 
uncooperative nodes was about 59.8 seconds without eC4MHA 
with a standard deviation of 5.14 seconds, and about 61.8 
seconds with eC4MHA, presenting a standard deviation of 5.57 
seconds. These main variances were mostly caused by mobile 
devices constraints, such as loss of Bluetooth connection or 
distance variations among mobile nodes. 
A performance evaluation analysis with the comparison to 
of both cryptography approaches for m-Health application, 
DE4MHA and eC4MHA was also considered and studied 
(Figure 7). Measuring the service average delay with both 
approaches it was demonstrated that eC4MHA is more 
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Significant changes were made to the previous proposed 
strategy considering that each cooperative node would be 
aware of message content by turning them acting uniquely as 
packet forwarders in this new approach. Results show a slight 
improvement in the performance of service average delay with 
the eC4MHA. In a worst case-scenario with three 
uncooperative nodes, the requester node would receive the 
response to the request in about 64.06 seconds with DE4MHA 
and a standard deviation of 5.57 seconds while with eC4MHA 
an average of 61.8 seconds would be necessary in order to 
receive the response, with a standard deviation of 5.56 seconds. 
 
Figure 7 – Performance comparison of the service average 
delay in function of the number of uncooperative mobile 
nodes for DE4MHA and eC4MHA. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposed a robust cryptography strategy for  
m-Health applications in a cooperative environment following 
a service-oriented architecture. This approach presented a 
solution where user health data is retrieved from a Web 
service through cooperation. It considers three main aspects: 
data confidentiality, data integrity, and data authenticity. The 
main objective of providing a cryptography solution for user’s 
health data for m-Health applications in cooperative scenarios 
was fully accomplished. Another accomplished goal was the 
improvement of an earlier-proposed cryptography strategy, 
called DE4MHA, resulting in the eC4MHA. 
The proposed solution was evaluated, demonstrated and 
validated through a real m-Health application, called SapoFit. 
Performance metrics were considered, such as service average 
delay and service delivery probability. The performance of the 
proposed eC4MHA was compared with DE4MHA. It was 
shown that it slightly increases service average delay and 
decreases service delivery probability. However, these results 
are totally feasible and tolerable in a real scenario and 
insignificant considering the assuring of privacy and security 
of the m-health data.  
A comparison of both cryptography approaches and the 
respective performance evaluation through simulation, with 
different network scenarios and scalability, is also considered. 
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